The Kurdish landscape Rivalry and retreat

On the 20th anniversary of the U.S. invasion and the subsequent downfall of the previous regime, as Iraq entered a new era, it is opportune to evaluate various aspects, notably the shifts within the political representatives of the different components involved in the ongoing transformation. The emergence of this new era marked the transition from a totalitarian regime, characterized by a one-party, one-man system, to a governance model that emphasizes power distribution among the diverse elements of Iraqi society—known as “muhasasa.” This system particularly focuses on the major components, or those deemed significant due to their majority status, in contrast to numerous other elements categorized as minorities by the previous regime.

The Kurds played a pivotal role in shaping the new identity landscape of the post-2003 republic. They established a Kurdistan Alliance aimed at capitalizing on years of opposition and decades of sacrifice endured by the Kurdish people in their struggle against successive Iraqi regimes. Despite achieving constitutional and national gains, as well as significant party privileges, this alliance faltered on certain fronts. Its shortcomings became evident during the previous parliamentary session (2018-2022), particularly regarding the election of the President of the Republic. Disagreements arose over candidate selection, resulting in the presentation of two candidates: Barham Salih for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Fuad Hussein for the Kurdistan Democratic Party. This discord persisted, leading to a political rupture within the alliance.

The longstanding rivalry between the two main Kurdish factions, the Democratic Party and the Union, spans approximately six decades. This conflict has often escalated into violent internal clashes, commonly referred to as the “war of brothers.” The most severe of these conflicts occurred between 1994 and 1996, eventually leading to a forced reconciliation in 1998 under pressure from the United States through the “Washington Agreement.”

This reconciliation marked a significant moment, formalizing the merger of their governmental administrations in 2005. They also agreed to share positions of power in both Baghdad and Kurdistan through mutual consent, an arrangement known as the “50-50” system, which was an extension of the local Kurdish governance structure. However, shifts in power dynamics and the emergence of new variables within the Kurdish political landscape disrupted this power-sharing agreement.

Subsequently, the region found itself embroiled in a challenging process of establishing a new system. The Kurdistan Democratic Party has been steadfast in its insistence on maintaining dominance, while its rival counterpart, the Patriotic Union, has sought to resist this assertion through various means.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, asserts its dominance in the Kurdistan Region through various strategic advantages and resources. Firstly, it leverages its significant numerical superiority in both the Baghdad and Kurdistan Region parliaments, with 31 seats in Baghdad compared to the Union’s 17, and 45 seats in the Kurdistan Region compared to the Union’s 18. Additionally, the KDP maintains control over the Kurdish capital, Erbil, which possesses a robust network of diplomatic relations and partnerships with foreign companies.

Furthermore, the KDP exercises authority over critical sectors such as oil management, which constitutes a substantial portion of the region’s financial revenue, and holds sway over security matters by controlling decision-making processes within key governmental institutions. Notably, the KDP’s influence extends to the presidency of the region, currently held by Nechirvan Barzani, and the leadership of the government, led by Masrour Barzani.

Moreover, the KDP has cultivated alliances with minority groups and smaller political parties, including those situated within the Union’s stronghold in the Sulaymaniyah governorate, thereby expanding its influence and solidifying its hegemonic position within the region.

The National Union, which faced a significant blow with the passing of its charismatic leader, Jalal Talabani, in October 2017, continues to grapple with internal divisions and factional struggles that have intensified over the past 15 years. These divisions were exacerbated by the departure of prominent leader Nawshirwan Mustafa, who formed the Change Movement in 2008, and culminated in the recent contest for the presidency between Pavel Talabani and Lahore Sheikh Janaki.

In its efforts to counter the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the National Union focuses on maintaining control over its traditional stronghold, particularly in Sulaymaniyah and its surrounding areas. It relies on its geographical positioning and its involvement in security and administrative matters within this historical territory. Furthermore, the National Union utilizes its ties with Tehran and its allies in Baghdad to impede the expansion of its rival’s influence, even within its own strongholds.

The disagreements center on power and wealth distribution, privilege allocation, and leadership of key positions within the federal government. These tensions came to a head during the 2022 presidential election, with the Democratic Party publicly accusing its rival of orchestrating the assassination of a dissenting security officer in Erbil. This development further strained the already tense relationship between the two parties.

This division is witnessing serious chapters from time to time in light of the weak role of the Kurdish parliament, the absence of inclusive institutions, and the fragility of the Kurdish situation, which is still suffering from the repercussions of the post-September 25, 2017, referendum that ended with the reduction of the region’s entity and the loss of control over the Kurdish crown jewel, Kirkuk, to the Iraqi federal forces, led by factions affiliated with the Hashd, which turned into a rival and sometimes an enemy of Kurdish forces particularly in Sunni areas that were reclaimed from ISIS along the region’s borders.

These divisions are continually inflamed, particularly as an international arbitration tribunal in Paris has issued a conclusive, , final and non-negotiable ruling that the region’s oil must be marketed through the Iraqi National Oil Marketing Company (SOMO). This decision has dealt a significant blow to Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, stripping away their last remaining leverage. This development has been met with internal public discontent, fueled by frustration over the mismanagement of the energy sector since 2009. The repercussions of oil-related setbacks have been keenly felt by citizens, particularly during the years 2014-2018.

There are serious concerns about the effects of this intractable rivalry on the discussions of the three-year budgets (2023, 2024 and 2025) and on other Kurdish issues in Baghdad, at a time when the government program has set timelines for resolving them, such as reinstating the Article 140 committee on Kirkuk and the conflict areas, forming the Federation Council, establishing a federal constitutional court and other files that affect the Kurdish situation.

Based on data and past experiences, it appears that conflicts continue to escalate without any effective measures in place to contain them. Despite various initiatives from the UN and Western nations, particularly the United States, these conflicts have yet to yield tangible results. This leaves them vulnerable to various undesirable outcomes, including the potential loss of the Kurdish governing experience established since 2005 and the potential dissolution of Kurdish influence in Baghdad. This risk is exacerbated by the intensifying political strife in the capital, which has escalated to the point of armed confrontation. Furthermore, the disregard for constitutional principles and the selective enforcement of laws have become notable characteristics of the current situation.

The Kurds’ ability to wield political influence hinges on their political unity and diplomatic ties. Without these factors, they struggle to assert their interests in the political arena, whether in the federal parliament or the Council of Ministers. This challenge has become particularly pronounced since they transitioned from being the primary advocates of their cause to being part of larger coalitions, such as the Movement and the Framework, after they were the “owners of a cause” and representatives of the most Iraqi nationalism supported by Western countries, led by the United States of America, against a Shiite-Sunni dissonance from everything Western after they achieved for the Shiites with their opposition forces the dream of overthrowing the bloody Baath Party regime that oppressed them.

The available data suggest that the likelihood of reverting to a two-administration system is greater than the prospects of reunification. This is evident in the ongoing boycott by ministers from the National Union in regional cabinet sessions for several months. This boycott reached its peak with the complete absence of the Union from resolutions of the oil file with the federal government. Their insistence on not returning until their demands are met indicates a preference for a return to the bipolar system, which the Democratic Party believes it had surpassed years ago, even before the Union plunged into internal conflict between Pavel Talabani and Lahore Sheikh Janaki on July 8, 2020.

Kurdish fragmentation has had a detrimental effect on their influence in Baghdad, for example, during 2006-2008. in the midst of sectarian fighting between Shiite and Sunni armed forces, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a US-backed plan to “enforce the law.” Due to distrust in the neutrality of the newly formed Iraqi forces at the time, the government resorted, with US support, to involve the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in protecting the security of the capital, while the federal parliament’s guards were turned into Kurdish affiliates, and in 2010 the “Erbil Agreement” ended a political stalemate brokered by then Kurdish regional president Masoud Barzani. In 2010, the “Erbil Agreement” ended a political stalemate with the mediation of then-Regional President Masoud Barzani, but now this picture is completely reversed as Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shi’a Al-Sudani tries to play the role of mediator between the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah axes, and the parties to the conflict within the National Union resort to the Baghdad courts to resolve the issue of their party leadership, and the Kurds are no longer the egg as they were during their golden years that followed 2003.

Kurdish divisions have significantly weakened their influence in Baghdad, particularly evident during the period of 2006-2008. Amid sectarian clashes between Shiite and Sunni factions, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki unveiled a US-supported initiative called the “law enforcement plan.” Due to concerns about the impartiality of newly formed Iraqi security forces, the government, with backing from the US, engaged Kurdish Peshmerga forces to bolster security in the capital. Additionally, guards for the federal parliament were replaced with Kurdish affiliates.

In 2010, the “Erbil Agreement,” brokered by then-Kurdish regional president Masoud Barzani, resolved a political deadlock. However, the current situation has undergone a complete reversal. Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shi’a Al-Sudani now attempts to mediate between the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah factions, while conflicts within the National Union are being brought before Baghdad courts for resolution. The Kurds no longer enjoy the prominence they once did during the post-2003 era, when they were at the height of their influence.

Kurdish divisions extend beyond mere disagreements over power and wealth distribution; they also encompass a loss of common ground and fundamental principles. In the initial three sessions of the Iraqi parliament (2005-2018), Kurdish parties collaborated within the federal government based on a shared agenda addressing core Kurdistan region issues. During this period, there existed a “Kurdistan Alliance.” However, in the current session, these parties have experienced a notable decline in their traditional political unity, diverging on issues they previously aligned on.

The handling of oil serves as a striking example of this rift. In 2009, the first oil shipments were exported from the region under the joint supervision and participation of Talabani and Barzani. Initially, oil management operated on a system of quotas and shared responsibility between the two parties for several years.

As UN Representative Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert has emphasized more than once, the Kurdistan Region has only two options: It can unite, confront systemic corruption, promote respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and make significant security and economic progress, or it can fail to do so. The future of the Kurdistan Region is in serious jeopardy due to the deep conflict currently taking place, and current indications suggest that the latter outcome is more probable unless a political breakthrough occurs or a saving solution appears on the basis of customary Kurdish precedents.

As of now, there are no signs of a return to normal relations between the two parties, and there’s no assurance that parliamentary elections will take place by the end of 2023. Despite the Kurdish parliament’s session being extended for an additional year after the failure of the two parties to agree on the timing of elections, there’s a clear disregard for democratic principles. The gap between the parties continues to widen as unresolved issues accumulate, exacerbating challenges faced not only by Kurdistan but also by other regions in Iraq. These challenges include youth unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, economic instability, drug-related issues, environmental concerns, and other ailments typical of rentier patronage regimes that rely on short-term and makeshift solutions to address these issues.

*Yassin Taha, a Kurdish researcher and journalist, worked in several Iraqi Kurdish research and media organizations and headed some of them.