Iraq: Two Decades of “Lethal Democracy”

In these days, twenty years ago, American aircraft and its allies dominated the sky of Mesopotamia, while tanks and other strange vehicles advanced toward Iraq to overthrow its president, Saddam Hussein. Back then, missiles soared fueled by the rhetoric of combating terrorism and preemptively defending American and global national security. The main justifications were twofold: Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and his support for the Al-Qaeda organization, accused of the September 11, 2001 events. However, these justifications did not stand the test of time and quickly revealed their fragility. A third justification emerged: liberating the Iraqis from one of the most tyrannical leaders on Earth and promoting democracy.

The Neo-Republicans firmly held control of the Oval Office in Washington and showed no inclination toward relinquishing it. The idea did not emerge out of nowhere, twelve years before that date, Washington led a military campaign to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi army. Saddam Hussein’s adventure had become the turning point in the United States’ perception of him and his regime. Everything that followed became an extended campaign of blockade, pressure, media warfare, and scattered missiles. The “regime change” concept transformed into law at the end of October 1998, titled the “Iraq Liberation Act,” which allocated 97 million dollars to support and empower the Iraqi opposition.

Even “democracy” itself was an idea to be spread in the Middle East, starting with Iraq, and awaiting its proliferation. This concept was embraced by the “neoconservatives” and supported by others, foremost among them the Zionist lobby and Israel itself. However, in the end, what motivated the United States and its allies to mobilize their armies without a UN mandate was primarily their need to regain their standing after the September blow. This is suggested by Richard Clarke, the counterterrorism official at the National Security Council, in his account of the night of the incident at the Emergency Operations Center, when President George Bush entered and said, “We are going to kick some ass.” He did not mean it literally.

As vehicles moved along the streets of Iraq, traversing its cities and provinces, a significant wave of chaotic looting occurred. Surprisingly, the US forces did not effectively intervene, allowing this phenomenon to unfold. The looting spared no targets, even extending to banks and museums, leading to the theft or dispersal of numerous institutions and valuable documents.

Immediately after the completion of the military occupation, the United States appointed an entity to manage the affairs of Iraq known as the “Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction of Iraq.” Retired American military officer Jay Garner was chosen to oversee it, but he was quickly replaced by Paul Bremer. The entity’s name was changed to the “Coalition Provisional Authority.”

The Bremer-led authority ordered the dissolution of the Iraqi army and, in July 2003, established the “Governing Council” whose task was to draft the constitution while possessing limited additional powers.

Those moments established an exceedingly complex system that espouses the slogan of “pluralistic democracy” while concealing or postponing significant issues. It became a system designed to govern a weary society plagued by ethnic and racial divisions.

Washington entrusted the task to the sole opposing elite, or what it believed to be the elite, which comprised a collection of parties, movements, and opposition figures in exile. They formed a diverse group with varying projects, goals, and perspectives on the idea of democracy, far from reaching a consensus on the concept of the state. However, they seized whatever opportunities were presented to them, and nothing more.

The 2003 invasion was the final bullet in the body of Iraqi institutions. After intense bombing campaigns and a complete blockade, coupled with an internal administration that instilled fear and prioritized the president’s and his entourage’s interests, the United States supported exclusionary transitional justice policies. These policies were exploited by the opposing elite to carry out revengeful purges that deprived the country of a range of experienced elites, either through the process of De-Ba’athification or acts of vengeance.

It restructured, in addition to the military, several state institutions or parts of them, and then rebuilt them according to a sectarian quota system that became the foundation for everything. Life became divided into sectarian shares under the pretext that it guarantees representation and participation for everyone in governance. This approach, similar to the Lebanese Taif Agreement, even extended to the selection of school guards.

The constitution, which was approved with a 78% majority vote in October 2005, was a result of the efforts of religious leaders, tribal elders, and promotional campaigns that ignited the desire for freedom after more than three decades of one-man rule. It was seen as the first sign of a new life, and most Iraqis who voted in favor of it did so without thoroughly examining its provisions. They believed it would be an inclusive and protective document, shielding them from harm, and closing the doors to death and tyranny, through the democracy it emphasized and the pluralism it reiterated. However, on the other hand, it solidified “sectarian quotas” and power-sharing terms like the representation of “components” and component-based balance, with provisions open to interpretation.

Over the course of the past twenty years, Iraqi politicians and officials, including the former head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zidan, have taken turns calling for constitutional amendments. Since the first elected parliament, constitutional amendment committees have been formed, while others have been delayed. The most recent attempts were two of them:

In October 2019, spurred by massive protests, the Presidency of the Republic formed a committee to amend the constitution and address its gaps. By the end of January 2023, Prime Minister Mohammed Shiya’ Al-Sudani appointed an advisor for constitutional affairs, and in early February, he announced that the advisor had met with the President and presented a constitutional amendment draft. However, none of these attempts have yielded results due to the absence of political consensus on the idea of amending the Constitution, much like its absence from everything else.

The immutable Constitution prohibits amendments that contradict the principles of democracy and enshrines a separate chapter for rights and freedoms. It includes provisions that are considered quite favorable compared to the era of non-constitutional rule that lasted for over 30 years before the occupation.

Despite being in effect for 20 years following the invasion, these constitutional provisions were unable to prove their strength. This is due to the existence of other provisions from the dictatorship era that are still enforced by the ruling class, notably the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 issued by the Revolutionary Command Council, which has not been abolished by the De-Ba’athification process. This code contains provisions contradicting the new constitution and its chapter on freedoms, yet it is still used to silence those the ruling class wishes to suppress.

Political forces have been suggesting for years the enactment of a law on “freedom of expression, opinion, peaceful assembly,” as if the Revolutionary Command Council’s legislation was not sufficient. Despite multiple attempts by parliamentary blocs to pass the law, there has been strong opposition from public opinion and proactive resistance from human rights activists. As a result, the law has been repeatedly postponed. Finally, on December 3rd, 2022, members of parliament held the first reading of the law, which will monitor what the people say, write, and express through their words, pens, and keyboards.

Another law that new Iraqi political forces have repeatedly sought to pass is the “Cybercrime Law,” which restricts the freedom to use social media platforms and imposes limitations on the media and press.

Without the need for a law, executive bodies occasionally invent ways to encroach upon the right of freedom of expression and other freedoms. In January 2023, the Ministry of Interior formed a committee to monitor what it considers “indecent” content on social media platforms.

They also established the “Balegh” (Report) platform, which allows individuals to report “media content published on social media platforms that include indecency, convey negative messages that offend public decency, and disrupt social stability.” The committee has referred at least 16 cases for criminal investigation by the judicial authorities based on complaints received through the “Balegh” platform. Authorities have already sentenced six individuals to imprisonment due to their posts on social media.

Pillars of the political process often do not require formal executive apparatus to silence their opponents or critics. They possess enough weapons, authority, and a realm outside the law to abduct or kill whomever they wish.

According to the 2023 report issued by the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Iraq has dropped to the 122nd position out of 179 countries on the democracy index. This comes after it was ranked 118th in the preceding year.

According to the “Democracy Index” report by The Economist Intelligence Unit, which annually studies 167 countries worldwide, Iraq’s index ranking has declined by 8 places, placing it at 124th worldwide.

In terms of press freedom, Iraq ranks 172nd out of 180 countries, as reported by “Reporters Without Borders.” The Committee to Protect Journalists recorded the deaths of 282 journalists and media professionals in Iraq between 2003 and 2023.

Since the invasion, democracy in Iraq has been limited to electoral processes, failing to encompass broader aspects. Party leaders and political factions consistently promote this narrow definition of democracy as the entirety of its meaning.

Since that time, Iraqis have participated in 6 legislative elections, a referendum, and 2 local elections for provincial councils:

• January 2005: Selection of members for the 275-seat National Assembly.
• October 2005: Referendum on the Iraqi Constitution.
• December 2005: First parliamentary elections to choose 275 deputies.
• January 2009: First provincial council elections in 14 provinces.
• March 2010: Second parliamentary elections to choose 325 deputies.
• 2013: Second provincial council elections.
• April 2014: Parliamentary elections to choose 328 deputies.
• May 2018: Parliamentary elections to choose 329 deputies.
• October 2021: Early parliamentary elections.

In subsequent elections, voter turnout and participation rates have declined. The turnout was 59% in the 2005 elections, 62.4% in 2010, and 60% in the 2014 elections. However, in the 2018 elections, it dropped to 44.52% and further declined to 41% in the early parliamentary elections of 2021.

The decline in voter turnout, in one way or another, reflects the lack of confidence among voters in the effectiveness of elections. This outcome should not come as a surprise when considering the lives of the voters/citizens and the challenging circumstances they face. These circumstances include rampant weapon proliferation and legislation, and deeply rooted and pervasive corruption that remains largely immune to accountability, even for high-ranking officials. This has led to Iraq’s placement at 157th out of 180 countries, with a score of only 23 points, on the Corruption Perceptions Index for the year 2022, published by Transparency International.

In a political system like the one created by the occupation on the ruins of a dictatorial regime, the corrupt will find an escape route, and another route to return in a cleaner image, and because the doors are endless in this system, they lead to each other, so that the paths of corrupt money intersect with the paths of weapons, terrorism, ignorance, and even sanctification.

All these details bring forth the question of democracy in its early stages. Upon analyzing these specifics and comparing them to successful or unsuccessful experiences in different regions worldwide, the straightforward answer is that democracy bears little resemblance to what has been experienced in Iraq.

Any democracy in the world first and foremost needs a state. The latter, on the other hand, primarily needs to monopolize power above all else, and all other things will come afterward.  A sectarian democracy will not succeed, nor will a democracy with a primitive rent-based economy. “Democracy” will be deemed a failure if it lacks a future vision for everything. It will be judged as a failure if education and healthcare deteriorate within it, and if its laws become selective or biased towards a particular entity.

Whether in its infancy or maturity, democracy is not solely defined by elections that are riddled with suspicion. There is only one undeniable conclusion: it has been 20 years of failed democracy, a democracy that has proven to be lethal.