Christians: 20 Years from Exodus to Extinction

Since the initial surge of violence that marked the breakdown of Iraq’s security following the US occupation and the overthrow of the Baath regime on April 9, 2003, religious and ethnic minority groups have faced direct and indirect attacks from armed religious and sectarian factions. These attacks have resulted in killings, kidnappings, and property seizures, compelling many to flee the cities where they had lived for generations. These displaced individuals sought refuge in safer areas within the country or became immigrants abroad. Those who remained faced further isolation, finding themselves concentrated in specific areas between those who remained steadfast on their land and those awaiting an opportunity to depart.

In Nineveh, the historical homeland of numerous minority groups, particularly Christians, who numbered 35,000 families in 2003, including 5,000 families residing in Mosul, the provincial capital, their ordeal began on November 11, 2004, commonly referred to as the “second day of the fall.” It was on this day that the security apparatus in Mosul collapsed, allowing elements of al-Qaeda to seize control of the streets and impose their laws and directives on the city’s inhabitants. This marked the onset of a daily struggle against US forces and the Iraqi National Guard, with al-Qaeda launching campaigns of murder, kidnapping, and intimidation targeting various segments of society, with Christians bearing the brunt of their aggression. These atrocities werefueled by the extremist organization’s propaganda, disseminated through loyalist preachers in certain mosques.

Meanwhile, the organization distributed CDs containing videos depicting its members brutally murdering Christian citizens in Mosul. Additionally, prominent church figures such as Archbishop Paulus Faraj Rahu of the Chaldean Church in Nineveh, Pastors Paulus Iskandar Behnam of the Syriac Orthodox Church, Munther al-Saqa of the Protestant Church, and Ragheed Aziz Matti Kani, pastor of the Chaldean Church of the Holy Spirit of Jerusalem in Mosul, were targeted for assassination. These acts were carried out with the explicit aim of instilling fear among the city’s Christian population and driving them away. As a result, the majority of Christians fled to towns in the Nineveh Plain, including Qaraqosh, Bartella, Talkef, Alqosh, and Karmless, which were effectively under the control of Kurdish forces from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

After 14 centuries, Mosul stands devoid of its Christian inhabitants

Following the seizure of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in June 2014, only 1,000 Christian families remained out of the 20,000 that once populated the city, as reported by Lewis Markus Ayoub, Vice President of the Hammurabi Organization for Human Rights.

These families resided in close proximity to 35 churches, church centers, and Christian schools scattered throughout the city. However, beginning on July 12, 2014, they were compelled to evacuate as the Islamic State issued an ultimatum: they could either stay and pay jizya, leave the city, or face execution.

The overwhelming majority of Christians opted to depart, with many leaving with only the clothes they wore as the organization seized all their possessions. Members of the organization marked the walls of their homes with the red letter “C” (in Arabic) representing the first letter of the word “Christian,” signaling that the property had been confiscated.

For the first time in 14 centuries, Mosul finds itself devoid of Christians. Similarly, most towns in the Nineveh Plain have been entirely deserted as residents fled to the Kurdistan Region. From there, many chose to emigrate to Europe, America, and Australia following the European Union and United States’ recognition of the persecution against Christians in Iraq as genocide.

After the liberation of Nineveh from ISIL in the summer of 2017, only 45% of the displaced Christians from the Nineveh Plain in 2014 returned to their former areas. Additionally, approximately 70 families returned to Mosul city. However, many of the returnees did not stay for more than a few months. They left again due to feeling unsafe and fearing a recurrence of their previous experiences, this time at the hands of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions controlling the Nineveh Plain. Notably, Brigade 30, which comprises fighters from the Shiite “Shabak” component, has been accused of seizing buildings and land belonging to Christians.

Chaldean Catholic Patriarch Cardinal Louis Raphael Sako has voiced his apprehension regarding the future of the Christian community in Iraq, citing ongoing migration as a significant concern. He highlighted that Christians continue to face rights violations, discrimination, and exclusion in areas such as employment, healthcare, and parliamentary representation. He stressed that their return to their native regions hinges upon several conditions, including a shift in societal attitudes, acknowledgment as equal citizens, protection from harassment and rights violations, and meaningful inclusion in political, legislative, and institutional reforms.

According to surveys and statements from Christian organizations, the prospects for Christians in Nineveh returning to their homes are diminishing. The return, even in small numbers, has been effectively put on hold for years due to a lack of confidence in the social climate and doubts about the ability of state security services to ensure their safety. Additionally, the economic situation in their areas of settlement in the Nineveh Plain and across the governorate has been faltering, further complicating their ability to return.

The Dream… Nineveh Plain Region

There are various reasons contributing to the reluctance of displaced Christians and migrants to return to Nineveh and Mosul. Among these reasons is the fading of their longstanding aspirations, notably the desire for autonomy in the Nineveh Plain. Since the US invasion and the downfall of the Baath Party regime in April 2003, they had hoped for the establishment of their own region. Furthermore, their demand for international protection within their communities in towns such as Qaraqosh, Bartella, Talsaf, Tal Kayf, and Alqosh has not been met.

Moreover, the Shabak community has expanded into their traditional towns, gradually becoming the predominant majority in the region. Their capacity to acquire land and real estate, coupled with their higher birth rates, has solidified their demographic presence. In contrast, Christian families tend to be smaller by nature. The Shabak, primarily engaged in agriculture and livestock farming, are known for their notable population growth. Their numbers have significantly increased over the past two decades, particularly given their limited migration compared to Christians and Yazidis who are looking to migrate, and who reside in the same region, and neighboring villages and towns with a diverse population mix.

Another factor contributing to the migration of Christians and Yazidis was the policy implemented by the 30th Brigade. Under the pretext of preventing demographic shifts, this policy prohibited the sale and purchase of real estate by non-Shabak minorities. Consequently, many Kurds and Arabs residing in the plain were displaced to cities under the governance of the Kurdistan Region. This resulted in the Shabaks becoming the majority in all areas of the Nineveh Plain. As a result, Christians recognize that any future elections in the region will not be in their favor. They anticipate that public positions and legislative councils will be dominated by the Shabak community.

The economic factor and other reasons

In Nineveh, Christians previously operated a significant portion of agricultural and livestock ventures, including poultry farms, egg hatcheries, chicken slaughterhouses, and feed factories. Additionally, they owned construction material factories, industrial workshops, and drafting shops. However, these enterprises were abruptly lost overnight due to the actions of ISIS. As a result, Christians now possess only immovable assets, namely real estate. Even this property has been subject to falsification and illegal sale during their displacement and migration, often facilitated by organized criminal groups, sometimes with the support of militias.

In recent years, many Christians have settled in diaspora countries and are constantly encouraging and assisting their relatives in Iraq to join them through reunification programs or regular and even illegal immigration.

According to unofficial statistics released by Christian organizations and institutions, the current total number of Christians in all of Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, comprising Chaldeans, Syriac Catholics, Orthodox, Assyrians, Armenians, and Evangelicals, amounts to 260,520,000 individuals. This figure represents a significant decline from the approximately 1.5 million Christians present in 2003.

The lack of trust in their surroundings is the primary reason most Christians hesitate to return. Some accuse their former neighbors, with whom they had longstanding relationships, of seizing their properties, both movable and immovable, after they were forced to leave the province in the summer of 2014. This suspicion persists among returnees even after the defeat of ISIL. Many are convinced that ISIL was not just a group of fighters who violated human rights but an ideology that still lingers in the minds of some Sunni Arabs, occasionally manifesting in their behavior. They fear that these attitudes could escalate into violence as they did before, while also acknowledging that Sunnis, in general, were among the primary victims of ISIL.

They argue that the dominant Shiite Islamist parties, which have shaped Iraqi governments over the past two decades, are imposing their agenda across the nation without considering the interests of other religious groups and sects. They go further, blaming these parties for the rise of takfiri groups that seized control of a significant portion of the country in 2014. They attribute this to the parties’ corruption, mismanagement of state institutions, and overall lack of trust in the new Iraqi system.

The efforts made by international and local organizations to support the return have been in vain. Rebuilding churches and holding conferences on tolerance, reconciliation and coexistence alone are not enough to convince displaced people in the cities of the Kurdistan Region to return, let alone migrants outside the country.

They draw comparisons between their current residences and the places they left behind. They consistently observe that the latter lack fundamental public services like electricity and water, alongside inadequate healthcare and education facilities, pervasive corruption, and nepotism within official circles. Additionally, they note the dominance of tribalism over urban development. Consequently, they opt to remain where they are for the sake of stability, or at least until Iraq transitions back to a law-governed state, free from terrorist groups or armed factions’ infringements.

The issue of Christians being displaced from their communities will persist, and their emigration from the country may continue, potentially leading to their disappearance from Iraq altogether. This trend could be reversed only if the government strengthens its authority, upholds the rule of law and institutions, eradicates discrimination based on ideology or culture, and embraces the principles of a citizenship state. In such a state, Christians would be recognized as full citizens with equal rights, participating in state administration and decision-making processes on an equal footing with others, in line with the principle of equal opportunities.