“The Dervish and the Sultan”: The Relationship between Sufism and Politics in Iraq

The Salafism ideology has tightened the noose on Sufism, depriving them of the benefits they previously obtained through the endowments of certain shrines attributed to righteous saints. This has diminished the influence of their spiritual leaders within society. However, how did the Sufis embark on a journey towards politics and “security,” and to what extent did it lead them?

On July 5th of last year, the thoroughfares of Ramadi, the capital and largest city of al-Anbar Governorate situated in western Iraq, witnessed the convergence of hundreds of protestors hailing from both the governorate itself and beyond. They rallied against “corruption” and in support of Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani’s efforts to combat it, as conveyed by statements from the demonstration organisers. They chanted slogans and raised banners affiliated with the Sufi Kasnazani order and its leader, Nehro Mohammed Abdul-Karim.

The gathering of the masses has rekindled discussions about the role of Sufi orders and factions, notably the Kasnazani order, in Iraq’s political landscape, even centuries after their establishment. Despite the consistent inclination of their spiritual leaders to retreat from public affairs and embrace seclusion in hospices for the practice of ritual religiosity, they generally maintain a critical stance towards politics and its participants.

Following 2003, the political life in Iraq has experienced the burgeoning influence of Sufism. This intensification was marked by the emergence of groups operating under Sufi banners, effectively penetrating the public sphere in political, military, and economic realms. These entities secured diverse levels of popular support across various Sunni provinces.

Engaging in political activities, these groups developed extensive local, regional, and international networks, accompanied by substantial economic interests. These networks infused vitality into these groups, broadening their popular footprint and endowing them with a form of legitimacy that positions them to assume diverse roles within the country.

Founders and Politics

Early on, Iraq was a primary cradle for the emergence of Islamic Sufism, especially during the Abbasid rule. This era gave rise to opulence and the emergence of materialistic inclinations ingrained in excessive indulgence.

At that time, Sufism served as a protest against the excessive indulgence in luxury and worldly pleasures. Heritage books housed numerous statements attributed to early Sufi figures such as Al-Hasan al-Basri, Ma’ruf al-Karkhi, Sari al-Saqati, Abu Bakr ash-Shibli, Al-Junayd Al-Baghdadi, Rabi’a al-‘Adawiyya, and others. These expressions unequivocally condemned “the world and its people,” advocating for asceticism, renunciation of personal desires, forgiveness towards others, and an earnest aspiration for the hereafter.

After the collapse of Abbasid rule and its aftermath, Sufi orders experienced a surge, proliferating rapidly, particularly as they spread throughout the Islamic world, both in the East and West. Despite the challenges of communication and outreach during those times, these orders consistently maintained a deliberate detachment from politics and public affairs. This stance was grounded in religious narratives and instructions handed down by their founding fathers, conveyed through their books, or transmitted directly by their disciples.

Nevertheless, Sufism underwent institutional evolution thereafter. Sufi orders associated with figures later identified as “al-Aqtab” (The Poles) emerged. These were distinguished Sufi leaders revered for their knowledge, endeavours, and reputed miracles.

With their widespread influence, rulers and sultans endeavoured to court the favour with the Sufis by bestowing gifts and contributing to the establishment and expansion of their hospices and lodges. This strategic gesture served as a form of appeasement, considering the Sufis’ substantial popular influence and transforming these offerings into instruments to gain legitimacy among the masses.

Simultaneously, there was a confluence with the emergence of philosophical inclinations embraced by certain Sufis, although these did not attain the status of official doctrines among the followers of these orders. The impact of these inclinations can be discerned in the writings and poetry of figures such as Al-Hallaj, Ibn Arabi, Ibn al-Farid, Ibn Sab’in, and others.

The Forbidden Fruit

Although the Sufis initially leaned towards political seclusion in their early history, there were periods when they actively participated in armed conflicts to liberate their nations from invaders. This occurred in Algeria with Emir Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri, in Dagestan led by Imam Shamil al-Dagestani, and similar instances in various regions of Africa and Asia.

In such instances, politics was viewed as the “forbidden fruit” by the majority of Sufis. Sayings such as “He made the servants do what he wanted” and “Mind your own business and let others mind theirs” were commonly shared among them. These sentiments were often regarded as “negative” by the broader community of jurists, as they were seen to deviate from the principles of “opposing falsehood and resisting it,” thereby abandoning the core tenet of “promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice.”

Nevertheless, distinguished Sufi figures did play reformative roles within society, exemplified by Sheikh Abdul Qadir al-Jilani, widely regarded as one of the brightest and most important figures in Sufism. He adhered to the doctrine of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who belonged to the Ahl al-Hadith school known for its precision and commitment to authentic narrations. This is noteworthy despite the later association of Sufism with “Interpretive” tendencies in later times.

Sheikh Abdul Qadir belonged to the Hanbali school, although many of his followers deviated from his approach to belief and conduct. Al-Jilani retained his position as the most influential figure in the Baghdadi community during the late Abbasid era, and the entire city came out to mourn his death in 561 AH.

Subsequently, Sufism in Iraq became primarily confined to hospices. The Sufis withdrew into their private circles until the “Faith Campaign” in the 1990s when the Ba’ath regime shifted from secular ideas to Islamic ones.

Spoils of the “Faith Campaign”

In that tumultuous decade marked by significant events and transformations, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, once a top deputy to Saddam Hussein, embraced the Kasnazani order and provided substantial support to it. This led to the sidelining of other religious groups, whether Sufi or otherwise.

During the bleakest days of the Iraq siege, the Kasnazani hospices held banquets and provided food to their disciples throughout the day. Meanwhile, members of the order settled disputes with their Salafist adversaries by composing reports accusing them of embracing “Wahhabism.” These allegations resulted in the imprisonment of many, coupled with charges of allegiance to Saudi Arabia amidst tensions with the neighbouring state.

Despite the privileges granted by the Ba’ath regime, certain members of the Kasnazani order collaborated with US forces in the early days of the invasion. Consequently, these collaborators became targets for the former regime’s agencies, ultimately leading to their elimination during the wartime period.

With the upheavals that the Iraqi society experienced following the US invasion, Sufi orders began to gather their dispersed elements and restructure their ranks to assume diverse roles in various regions of Iraq.

Nevertheless, these orders encountered a significant challenge due to the declining faith in Sufism and its diminished influence, particularly among the youth. Simultaneously, there was a noticeable surge in various Salafi trends across its different schools. This trend and its militants began to fight Sufism in their traditional strongholds, including Baghdad, Fallujah, Hawija, and Diyala.

The Salafist ideology tightened its grip on Sufism, depriving them of the benefits they previously obtained through the endowments of certain shrines attributed to righteous saints. This has diminished the influence of their spiritual leaders within society, stripping them of much of their strength and impact, subjecting them to “ridicule” and accusations in various circles.

Militants and Dervishes

The prominent reemergence of Sufis post-2003 was exemplified by the “Naqshbandi Order,” representing the most substantial armed faction associated with the Ba’ath Party, as per official statements from the Iraqi army. They fiercely defended the “legitimacy of the former regime” and opposed the new system “created by the occupation.”

The Naqshbandis presented themselves as defenders of the Iraq’s Arab-Islamic identity, explicitly rejecting the sectarian quota system, as articulated in their official statements and platforms.

The activities of this group were mainly concentrated in the governorates of Salah al-Din, Diyala, Nineveh, and Kirkuk. They managed to attract quite a few former army officers, leveraging their experiences to develop some primitive weapons in their possession and reorganising fighters in a more coordinated and structured manner.

The armed rhetoric of the Naqshbandis was primarily directed towards Americans, and they did not openly adopt the idea of confrontation with the new Iraqi army. However, subsequent events led them into clashes in various regions with the army and federal police, incurring significant losses.

However, the harshest blows to the Naqshbandi order came from ISIS, which accused them of blasphemy, apostasy, and collaboration with the government. After seizing control of Mosul in June 2014, ISIS pursued and executed dozens of its members, compelling the order to withdraw from public life and maintain silence until the liberation of Mosul from the terrorist group.

In contrast to the Naqshbandis who immersed themselves in public affairs and armed activities, the “Rifai Order” delved into seclusion from public life, expanding its focus on ritualism. Possibly influenced by its Shiite surroundings, especially given its significant presence in mixed areas in Baghdad and the south, and the shrine of its founder is situated in a district named after him in Maysan Governorate, located 402 km south of Baghdad.

The Rifai Order became known for some peculiar rituals, such as striking with swords, metal skewers, eating glass, and walking on hot coals, as a means of proving the “miracles feats” of its adherents.

Generally, the Rifai Order no longer enjoys popularity within the Sunni circles, notably due to the increasing influence of Salafism. The Dervishes of the Order have retreated to their rituals and liturgies, while the grave of Al-Rifai has transformed into a shrine visited by numerous Sufi followers from within Iraq and beyond.

Allies of the Victorious

Amidst the transformations witnessed in Sunni provinces following the defeat of “ISIS,” several religious and political groups emerged. One notable group is the “Al-Rebat Al-Mohammadi Scholars Council,” which has close ties with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), leading its members to assume various positions within the organisation. Additionally, they actively participate in government committees focused on “combating extremism.”

Today, the council’s activity extends from Mosul to Basra. Many believe it seeks to control a significant number of mosques, utilising them to promote its discourse openly opposing Salafism and Wahhabism ideologies.

Throughout the years, the council has sustained a presence in some governmental institutions in Anbar, Nineveh, and Basra. Nevertheless, it has abstained from formally declaring the establishment or endorsement of an organisational entity for political engagement, despite forming extensive alliances with both governmental and non-governmental parties across various governorates.

Alongside this council, small scattered Sufi groups have emerged, but they are neither influential nor active on the scene, lacking significant popular support. An exception is the “unique” case of the Kasnazani Sufi order, which has begun to gradually expand both horizontally and vertically within the Kurdistan region, where its spiritual leader resides, and beyond.

Despite all the shifts in the Iraqi scene, the Kasnazani order has endured, assuming diverse political, economic, and social roles since 2003. Nevertheless, it still encounters several obstacles, notably dissatisfaction within Sunni religious circles in general and speculations about its ambiguous relations with both the Iranian regime and the United States concurrently.

Political Sufism

On July 4, 2020, the spiritual leader of the Kasnazani Order, Sheikh Mohammed Abdul-Karim, passed away in the United States, where he was receiving medical treatment. He was succeeded in his executive and spiritual roles by his son Nehro, who had previously engaged in some political and religious roles in the post-2003 years.

Nehro Mohammed Abdul-Karim holds numerous certifications from within Iraq and abroad, as detailed in his autobiography published on platforms associated with the Order. Known for his controversial profile, he maintains strong ties with both American and Iranian sides. Abdul-Karim has endeavoured to “renew” the Kasnazani Order, broadening the circle of its members and presenting it in a more modern and contemporary manner compared to its previous image.

The Kasnazanis assert that they opposed the previous regime, establishing the “Coalition for Iraqi National Unity” in 1991, which became public after 2003. They launched the renowned newspaper “Al-Mashriq” and later the Al-Mashriq TV channel, which reportedly closed down later due to financial reasons.

The Kasnazani family additionally founded various organisations and centres, including the “Al Salam University College” in Baghdad. Over time, this institution evolved into one of the primary sources of financing their activities.

Despite their close ties with Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri and his support for their order at the expense of others, followers of the Kasnazani order tried to distance themselves from Saddam Hussein’s regime, accusing it of persecuting them and detaining some of their prominent figures.

According to reports in Western newspapers, the Nehro family is said to possess significant economic holdings in both the United States and Europe. These include security and commercial enterprises, as well as ownership of oil fields. The family is believed to have acquired these assets through a longstanding history of cultivating relationships with influential entities in Washington and London.

This became evident during Nehro’s visit to the United States in 2018, where he spent 26 days at the “Trump” hotel, a property affiliated with the former U.S. President Donald Trump’s business group, according to “The Washington Post.”

The newspaper further confirmed that in July 2018, Nehro sent a message to John Bolton, the National Security Advisor at the White House, and Mike Pompeo, the former Secretary of State. In the message, he expressed his support for the U.S. efforts aimed at undermining the Iranian religious regime and eliminating its influence in the region.

Deals and Accusations

The Kasnazanis advocate for the separation of religion from politics, and they have been engaged in the new political process since its commencement. Nonetheless, owing to their limited popular influence, they were not involved in influential negotiations, and their inability to secure significant seats in Parliament.

Nevertheless, through political deals with influential Shiite forces, they managed to secure a position in Haider al-Abadi’s government in 2014. This was achieved through Malas Mohammed Abdul-Karim al-Kasnazani, Nehro’s brother and a leader in their party, who assumed the trade portfolio, representing the Kurdistan Alliance.

The new minister’s tenure was short-lived as he was convicted of corruption and subsequently dismissed in 2015. He, along with two officials in his ministry, faced charges of embezzling $14.3 million. Despite these charges, he managed to evade the government and judiciary’s grasp.

Malas himself had faced other charges before, resulting in the Supreme Judicial Council issuing a decree on February 27, 2014, preventing him from participating in parliamentary elections. He had previously been sentenced to ten years in prison under Article 289 of the Penal Code for forging official documents.

In the 2021 elections, their candidate associated with the Progress Party (Taqadum), Gandhi Al-Kasnazani – who is also Nehro’s brother – emerged victorious in Baghdad’s 12th district. This district encompasses various areas in Karkh, including Mansour, Yarmouk, Hayy Al-Jami’a, al-Qadisiyyah, Al Khadhraa, and Al-A’amiriya.

However, relations between the two parties have recently shown signs of tension, particularly after the leadership of the Order decided to align with opponents of the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammed al-Halbousi.

In what seems to be a delicate balancing act or a strategic manoeuvre between Washington and Tehran, the Kasnazani leadership in Sulaymaniyah maintains close ties with the Iranian regime. This connection is reinforced by the substantial presence of hundreds of thousands of followers of the Sufi Order on the other side of the border, in the Kurdish regions of Iran.

On every religious occasion associated with the Order, the border posts with Iran witness the arrival of thousands of followers adorned in long hair and traditional costumes. They eagerly make the journey from within Iranian territory to the hospice headquarters in Sulaymaniyah, participating in the rituals of the order and seeking blessings from their spiritual leader.

The Unknown Future

Mapping out the Sufi forces and determining their size and influence in present-day Iraq proves to be a challenging undertaking. The complexity of the matter is heightened by various intricacies and undisclosed subtle details that defy clear measurement.

However, extrapolating contemporary Iraqi history and tracking its events in recent decades leads to several conclusions in this regard. Primarily, there is a noticeable withdrawal of Sufism from Sunni regions, marked by a decline in its presence and influence, juxtaposed with the ascent of other, more dynamic, and influential religious currents.

These consecutive setbacks have compelled some Sufi orders to seek compensation by forming alliances with influential forces on the ground, playing significant roles in the political process despite their slogans of avoiding and distancing themselves from politics.

Shiite actors wielding influence on the ground have endeavoured to breathe life into Sufi groups in liberated areas by supporting them financially and providing political and security coverage. The aim is to establish an alternative to Salafist groups with pronounced anti-Shiite stances. However, these efforts have not yielded the formation of popular movements garnering substantial grassroots support in those regions.

In general, it is impractical to categorise all Sufi groups uniformly or assess them using identical criteria. The evident ideological and methodological diversity among them in recent years highlights that certain events may bring specific groups back into the spotlight. This is often attributed to their flexible religious approach and less confrontational positions towards those with differing religious beliefs, coupled with a popular aversion to politics and its affairs.

Nevertheless, all of these scenarios remain speculative, lacking concrete evidence on the ground. Particularly, Sunni religious institutions in Iraq no longer place trust in these Sufi orders, collaborate with them, or seek to contain them. Their past experiences are perceived as insufficiently fruitful to garner trust and support, according to their opponents.

* This article received support and supervision from the Network of Iraqi Reporters for Investigative Journalism (NIRIJ) and was published on the Jummar website.