The death of Ali Khamenei opens a new chapter in Iran. The regime stands at a crossroads, protests continue, and the ruling elite searches for balance, while the country’s political future remains uncertain.
After weeks of threats from U.S. President Donald Trump against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and intermittent negotiations between the two sides, the United States launched violent strikes targeting sites in the Iranian capital, Tehran. Most notably, the presidential compound was hit, where Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was present.
As Supreme Leader from 1989 until his death in 2026, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was the highest authority in Iran, exercising constitutional power over its political, military, judicial, and media institutions far exceeding that of elected officials such as the president or parliament. He controlled key bodies such as the Revolutionary Guard and the Guardian Council, set the general policies of the Islamic Republic, directed foreign relations and national security, and shaped domestic life through a theocratic system that harshly suppressed opposition in all its forms, centralizing decision-making in his office.
The roots of the current unrest in Iran trace back to late December 2025, when widespread protests erupted as a result of political and economic grievances, including high inflation, unemployment, and the continued repression of civil liberties. What began as protests over economic conditions quickly evolved into movements against the regime as a whole, with citizens—especially women and youth—challenging the authoritarian policies of the government and the authority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Despite the state’s severe crackdown, including arrests, censorship, and the violent dispersal of demonstrations, protests continued intermittently in major cities, paving the way for escalating tensions and widespread public reactions following Khamenei’s death.
Although security forces, under Khamenei’s leadership, largely suppressed the demonstrations, sporadic unrest continued, including student protests at major university campuses and large gatherings at the funerals of those killed, where people expressed symbols of resistance through dancing, singing, and weeping for their loved ones, acts of defiance and challenge.
Although Ali Khamenei was the most influential figure at the apex of Iran’s power structure, his absence does not mean the collapse of the regime, because the Islamic Republic was not built around an individual, but around an ideological doctrine and a solid, intertwined institutional system designed to ensure continuity.
Certainly, the killing of Ali Khamenei represents a pivotal event in the history of the Islamic Republic, but it is not necessarily a moment of collapse; it may instead be a moment of reshaping the regime in a new form, though not necessarily with new substance.
The disappearance of the most powerful figure in the system does not automatically mean its immediate destabilization. The Islamic Republic was not constructed as a purely personal rule, but as an integrated system of religious, military, and security institutions whose overlapping authorities ensure survival. The Revolutionary Guard, the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, and the intelligence services together form a safety net for the regime, making it difficult for the Supreme Leader’s absence to become a moment of automatic collapse. The system was originally designed to reproduce itself in times of danger.
While Khamenei’s killing constitutes a profound political and symbolic shock, the structure of governance in Iran is designed to function even in the absence of any individual or leader, regardless of their importance or position. The Islamic Republic is not merely like other dictatorships that fall with the fall of the leader, such as Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and more recently Syria, because the Iranian system is not based solely on the Supreme Leader’s charisma, but on an interconnected institutional structure composed of the Revolutionary Guard, the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, and security agencies—ideological loyalty networks that ensure the continued functioning of the state even in moments of leadership vacuum.
A key example of this is the historical experience following Khomeini’s death in 1989, which demonstrated that the system is capable of internally reproducing new leadership, as long as institutions continue operating within their legal and constitutional frameworks.
In short, the interlocking institutions and their mutual ideological loyalty make them more capable of containing shocks.
The Assad regime collapsed relatively quickly when it lost external support and its internal structures eroded. Power was heavily concentrated in Bashar and his family, without deep national institutions capable of maintaining control once loyalties deteriorated, leading to the effective collapse of the state once protests erupted and violence escalated.
In Iran’s case, the situation is different: the regime’s core institutions, especially the military and security apparatus, are not tied to the existence of a particular individual, but are networks of loyalty and bodies that ensure the regime’s survival even in the leader’s absence. The Syrian scenario, where the fall of a central figure led to rapid collapse, does not directly apply to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The fundamental difference between the Iranian case and other regional experiences, such as Syria, lies in the fact that the Iranian regime was not entirely reduced to a single individual, but became entrenched over four decades within intertwined religious, military, and security institutions designed to withstand shocks. While Khamenei was the key figure balancing power centers, and his absence may open the door to silent internal struggles between factions, this would fall within a redistribution of influence rather than the disintegration of the state.
Khamenei’s fall does not mean the fall of the Islamic Republic, but it may mark the beginning of a different phase in its lifespan—a phase in which the internal balance of power is redefined, not its end, at least not now.
The real test will not be in the first days after the assassination, but in the months following the selection of a new successor, and in the regime’s ability to manage simultaneous challenges: controlling the الداخل, preserving elite cohesion, and repositioning itself regionally after an unprecedented blow, before chaos overtakes the Iranian street. If institutions succeed in producing a leadership that is internally acceptable and capable of imposing discipline, the regime may emerge from the crisis more militarized and more closed, leaving behind a disillusioned and exhausted public after the mirage of change. However, if internal competition turns into open division, or coincides with a broad social explosion and the emergence of a strong and unified opposition, only then can real fractures be discussed.
The most dangerous scenario for the Iranian regime’s continuity does not lie in external pressure or public anger alone, but in the possibility of division within the ruling elite. Since its founding, the Islamic Republic has relied on a delicate balance between the religious establishment, the Revolutionary Guard, the security apparatus, and the economic interest networks linked to them. As long as this balance remains intact, the regime can absorb shocks. But if competition over succession or redistribution of influence turns into open conflict among these centers, the internal rift could become more dangerous than any external threat. Ideological regimes do not collapse when attacked from outside, but when their elites lose the ability to reach consensus and conflict shifts from managing differences within the system to contesting its very legitimacy.
The real structural threat to the regime’s survival lies not in external pressures or intermittent protests, but in the possibility of division within the ruling elite itself. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has not been governed through a purely singular center, but through a complex web of balances among the religious establishment, the Revolutionary Guard, security agencies, and economic power centers linked to them. This balance was not based on complete harmony, but on the careful management of conflicts within the regime’s ideological framework. Under a strong Supreme Leader, disagreements could be contained and privileges redistributed to prevent open confrontation. In the post-Khamenei era, however, the question of who holds the final word becomes more sensitive. If competition for influence turns into open struggle among factions, or if an institution such as the Revolutionary Guard feels its interests are threatened by another religious or political wing, the imbalance would be structural rather than temporary. Ideological regimes typically do not collapse solely due to street pressure, but when their elites lose the ability to manage disputes within the rules of the game, and competition shifts from being within the system to being over the nature of the system itself.
In contrast, the absence of a unified and organized political opposition plays a central role in shaping a new balance. The Iranian opposition, despite its media and symbolic presence, suffers from clear ideological and geographic fragmentation—between reformist forces from within the system, opposition groups in exile, and youth movements lacking formal organization. This fragmentation deprives any internal movement of centralized leadership capable of transforming public anger into an alternative political project.
The absence of a clear transitional program or a leadership enjoying national legitimacy or broad popular support makes sectors of society hesitant to leap into the unknown. In such circumstances, even if a division occurs within the elite, the absence of an opposition force capable of capitalizing on the moment allows the regime to reorganize itself rather than collapse, and also reduces the likelihood of Western support for a new political system. In other words, the Islamic Republic’s balance does not rest solely on its internal cohesion, but also on the weakness of the opposing side. Its relative stability is the product of a dual equation: an elite capable of containing its differences, and an opposition unable to unite around a convincing alternative.
Ultimately, the future of the Islamic Republic remains complex and open to multiple possibilities. Widespread public anger and deep frustration create conditions that appear ripe for change, yet their impact remains limited in the absence of a unified opposition leadership capable of transforming this discontent into a coordinated political movement. Divisions among internal and external factions, and the lack of a clear political program, mean that any attempt to bring about radical transformation will face significant challenges, both domestically and in securing external support.
Even Western powers, including the United States and Israel, which have strategic interests tied to regional stability and the containment of Iranian threats, find themselves constrained by limited options. Without an internal alternative capable of governing, any direct intervention or external encouragement for regime change could lead to political vacuum and greater chaos. In this sense, the future of the Iranian regime remains suspended between a genuine popular desire for change and objective constraints on the opposition’s and the West’s ability to turn that desire into tangible reality—making any prediction of imminent collapse merely a hypothesis requiring deeper structural transformations than the death of the Supreme Leader alone.
Despite the security forces’ crackdown under Khamenei’s leadership, protests continued intermittently, including student demonstrations on major university campuses and large gatherings at the funerals of those killed, where people expressed symbols of resistance through dancing and singing while mourning their loved ones, as acts of resistance and defiance.
Following the announcement by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the U.S. President of Khamenei’s assassination shortly after midnight local time, people took to the streets in several cities, including Tehran, Shiraz, and Sanandaj, celebrating with dancing and singing under a night sky lit by the flashes of rockets.
Meanwhile, Iran’s ruling elite is attempting to find solutions to rebalance power and avoid any political vacuum that could lead to the regime’s disintegration. Most of the opposition remains weak and divided, unable to present a unified stance or genuine leadership capable of channeling public anger into sustained political mobilization, limiting the ability of any external actor to support regime change and leaving the future of political transformation in the country open and unresolved.
