In November 2023, Ali Qais, 23, from the Al-Kifah district in central Baghdad, took a surprising step by traveling to Russia after receiving an invitation to study the Russian language — a requirement for admission to Russian institutes.
Months earlier, Ali, who held only a middle school certificate, had contacted an Iraqi resident in Russia involved in smuggling, known as “Aboud, the Son of Iraq.” Aboud persuaded him to travel for study or immigration, saying the study invitation cost $2,300, plus $700 for the flight ticket, and promised to handle all registration, residency, and accommodation arrangements.
Two other young men, Muqtada (22) and Hussein (23), arrived in Krasnoyarsk, eastern Russia, around the same time. Their dream was to immigrate to Germany through Russia and Belarus. However, Aboud — the smuggler and supposed study facilitator — convinced them to stay temporarily, claiming the migration routes were “dangerous” and promising them suitable jobs after two months of basic Russian language study.
After weeks of waiting for study and residency papers, the three discovered that the Iraqi smuggler was a fraudster, demanding additional payments for registration while providing no actual services. They felt stranded.
“I ran out of money, so after four months, I had to work in a meat factory in Krasnoyarsk — only to be expelled from the language institute, which claimed that work is forbidden for foreign students,” says Ali. He realized that his escape from unemployment in Iraq had led to something worse in Russia: “The study opportunity vanished — it was an illusion — and the doors to immigration were closed or dangerous, as the smugglers say.”
Facing this “predicament,” Aboud presented an enticing offer to the three lost youths: volunteering in the Russian Army with significant privileges, provided they pay him $1,000 each.
The offer failed because they were wary of Aboud and, crucially, lacked the money.
Ali recounts contacting another smuggler, (A.J), who offered similar services and detailed the benefits of volunteering: “It will mean obtaining Russian citizenship and passport and becoming a European citizen, providing a fixed salary and bonuses.” Ali continues: “We were in a very difficult situation and had no other options, so we took that path, paid about half the amount the first smuggler asked for, and became fighters in the war.”
The Oryol Trap
After discussions with the Iraqi smuggler (A.J), residing in Oryol (370 km southwest of Moscow), Ali agreed to volunteer, abandoning the costly study idea. They agreed to pay $600 to (A.J) for completing the official volunteering procedures.
(A.J) manages a Telegram channel promoting study offers to Iraqis in Russia, but systematically uses it as a backdoor for military recruitment and “human smuggling.”
Ali testified that (A.J) promised the Russian Army would cover all transport costs from Krasnoyarsk to Oryol, which houses the military service selection center for foreign volunteers. The three Iraqis traveled to Oryol by train, a three-day journey that included food, drink, and accommodation.
Ali, who is still serving in the Russian Army, states: “At the camp, my comrade and I signed the contracts to join the Russian Army. We were housed in a decent place, and the treatment was friendly. They promised us salaries ranging from $2,500 to $5,000 monthly based on years of service, plus Russian citizenship, a passport, and a plot of land.”
“Do you want to study… or volunteer?”
“You want to study or volunteer… I’m ready, but I don’t advise volunteering because it’s a red death,” the smuggler (A.J.) quickly replied via phone when the investigator expressed a desire to travel to Russia.
He set the price at $2,000, including security approval, airport reception, study invitation, accommodation, insurance, visa, medical examinations, fingerprints, and offering larger facilitation packages, including payment in four installments: the first paid from Iraq, and the remainder upon arrival at Moscow airport.
Officially, Russia’s doors are open not only to students and tourists but increasingly to those wishing to volunteer.
On July 7, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new law opening the Russian army to non-citizens.
The law grants foreigners the right to contract for military service, receive government pensions, and, most importantly, the opportunity to apply for Russian citizenship after only one year of service, without the need for permanent residence in Russia.
This step has been described as one of the Kremlin’s key strategies to address the human resource shortage needed for the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Behind these legal facilities and privileges, there are complex field stories, where economic factors intersect with migration, citizenship, and war, leading thousands of young Iraqis to find themselves part of it.
In the western Russian city of Voronezh (500 km from Moscow), where the head of the Iraqi community in the province, Dr. Haider Fadel Muhammad Al-Shammari, has lived since 2015, he recounts how the new legal amendments became a gateway for Iraqis wishing to officially join the Russian army.
Al-Shammari says in a low but tense voice: “The law greatly facilitates the entry of foreigners, including Iraqis, into the army. Today, we have about two thousand Iraqis serving under official contracts with a monthly salary of around $3,000, and about three thousand others fighting alongside the Ukrainian army.”
The new Russian law also stipulates that any foreigner residing in Russia, provided they are proficient in Russian, can sign a volunteer contract with the Russian army, where the salary ranges between $2,500 and $3,000 per month—an attractive sum given the difficult economic conditions many young Iraqis face while living in Russia.
We tried to obtain a position from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Iraqi participation in the ongoing war, but the ministry referred us to the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow.
In a phone call with the acting ambassador, Khalil Al-Shammari, he confirmed that “recruitment is conducted secretly via social media (Facebook and Telegram), supervised by individuals inside and outside Iraq. As an embassy, we reject the recruitment of Iraqis in this war.” He noted that the embassy opened an investigation and mentioned the existence of tourism companies bringing youth to Russia under the guise of tourism.
He accused the head of the Iraqi community in Voronezh of “luring young Iraqis into the war.” After being exposed, this individual “began appearing in the media as a defender of Iraqis and an opponent of recruitment.”
Others accuse the Iraqi community leader in Voronezh of involvement in recruitment operations. In a video, a young Iraqi recruit named “Zaid” from Najaf accuses Haider Al-Shammari of luring him into the Russian army. Zaid appears lying on a hospital bed injured, allegedly by a drone strike.
These accusations prompted us to review Haider Al-Shammari’s records. He manages a Facebook page called “The Iraqi Community in Russia.”
In a post dated October 10, 2022, Al-Shammari appears sitting in an official meeting with members of the city mayor’s coordination council and the General Director of the Russian Migration and Passports Department in Voronezh. The meeting, attended by a Russian army dean and several officials from the Ministry of Interior, discussed “legal developments and Iraqi issues in Russia and the new military service law.”
Al-Shammari explains in the post: “Any foreigner present in Russia today can apply for a military service contract. They must know Russian to interact with others. The contract lasts no less than a year, and all applicants will receive training in special camps regardless of their military experience.”
He confirms in the post that “any residency issues can be overlooked unless they involve terrorism or violations of Russian law. After completing service, the volunteer receives citizenship for themselves and their family, a monthly salary, and a veteran card granting benefits in resorts and 50% off basic utility bills.”
He concludes the post with an open invitation: “Whoever wishes to join can contact me for assistance.”
The List of the Missing
On July 25, 2024, Abu Safaa Al-Hamdani, a former member of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, told his family he was taking a short trip to northern Iraq. Two days later, he called from Russia, announcing he was going to fight and promised to secure Russian citizenship for himself and bring his family over after one year of service.
His family lost contact on November 11, 2024. Their search led them to an Iraqi lawyer in Russia who charged $5,000 to confirm his fate. The family received a list from the lawyer showing 79 missing Iraqis between October 2024 and May 2025, including Abu Safaa. The list contained young men born between 1999 and 2004.
The official stance in Baghdad remains vague. Muthanna Amin, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, downplays it as “individual cases,” arguing that Iraq cannot be held internationally accountable for the individual choices of citizens, citing the precedent of ISIS recruits from various nations.
However, victim records indicate recruitment into the Russian Army, and potentially other groups. In April 2023, the Wagner Group announced the death of Iraqi citizen Abbas Abu Dharr Wtout during battles in Ukraine. Wtout was described as a “good fighter who lost his life in a heroic way” by former Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Accused Universities
(Z.A.) Al-Najafi, an operative within the smuggling network (A.J.), revealed that Russia’s Oryol University actively sends study invitations to Iraqis. He explained that if an Iraqi accepts and decides to volunteer for the Russian army, the university supports the process by completing and tracking their volunteer files in detail.
He added, “Most Russian universities have agreements with the Russian army and benefit from encouraging foreigners to volunteer.”
Al-Najafi warned about what volunteers face. When we expressed interest in volunteering, he explained: “Iraqi and Arab volunteers, including Syrians, Yemenis, and Moroccans, spend the first two months in liberated Ukrainian areas with Russian forces, tasked with holding territory. If developments occur, they are pushed toward active combat zones.”
According to the smuggler, Iraqi volunteers undergo a 45-day military training course in a Russian camp, receiving $400 during training, with a post-training salary of $2,500. Specialized roles can earn $5,000, along with land, Russian citizenship, and a passport under a one-year renewable contract. Volunteers must be physically fit, free of chronic injuries or certain surgeries, and have a family-appointed representative to receive benefits in case of death, including $80,000 compensation.
Z.A. explained alternative recruitment: Iraqis whose residency expires or who are detained while trying to reach Europe via Belarus are offered a choice—join the Russian army or face deportation without return. Volunteers are deployed to frontlines after training.
Despite Russia’s official halt of study invitations and visas for Iraqis and some Arab nationals at the end of 2023, aimed at curbing migration waves to Europe, social media posts continue promoting Russian visas and study invitations. Z.A. noted that the ban was briefly lifted in November 2024, after the Russian elections in March 2024.
Another smuggler, H.R., confirmed these details and added that training takes place in Rostov. Volunteers can serve in city-based reserve forces or frontline units. The total cost of visa, airfare, and recruitment processing is $2,500. Russian residency of one year is required, but no Russian language knowledge is necessary. Phones are confiscated during training, then returned upon completion (45–50 days).
H.R. also described volunteers’ post-enlistment life: after six months, they receive Russian citizenship and passports, a 15-day leave to bring family to Russia, and then return to complete military service—all arranged via a Russian-appointed translator. Communication with families often ends once volunteers enter training camps.
From 2022 to late 2024, around 700 Iraqi youths in Russia volunteered for the Russian army. Daily social media requests for volunteering are high, though only a few are accepted. Deceased volunteers are buried in Russia, and their families receive Russian passports and citizenship.
After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022, some Iraqi youths received online invitations to volunteer. The Iraqi consulate warned against participation, threatening arrest and deportation.
Smugglers primarily operate via the Russian Telegram app, often under real names or openly, promoting Russian army recruitment and illegal migration, including pricing and procedures.
In March 2022, the Russian consulate in Basra continued accepting Iraqi applicants, framing the Ukraine war as a military operation against the U.S.- and NATO-backed “Nazi regime.” The same month, a large poster of President Vladimir Putin appeared in Baghdad, near the University of Baghdad and the Asaib Ahl al-Haq movement’s headquarters, reading “We Support Russia” in English and signed “Friends of the President.”
These campaigns, messages, and images indicate an environment in Iraq sympathetic to Russia, indirectly encouraging Iraqis to join the Russian army as mercenaries.
Defending the Homeland First: Official Reactions
Testimonies indicate that Iraqi youth are initially lured by innocent-looking study invitations or tourist visas that quickly turn into formal military contracts, though officials maintain these are individual cases.
Allawi Al-Nadawi, a member of the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, stated that the parliament would discuss the issue if group enlistment is confirmed, emphasizing that the Iraqi constitution forbids Iraq from being a source of aggression against any country.
Conversely, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, Ali Abbas Jahankir, downplayed the danger, but stressed that joining the fighting as a mercenary is illegal and strictly prohibited.
MP Alia Nasif refuted the “individual cases” narrative, citing evidence of clear and organized recruitment through fake invitations. She called on the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to “act quickly to bring them back” to prevent a tragedy, stressing that true martyrdom is in “defending the homeland and its issues.”
MP Amer Abdul-Jabbar revealed that some Iraqis were directly recruited by the Russian Ministry of Defense and are now seeking help to return. He also cited cases, including two Iraqi doctors who volunteered to treat the wounded, only to be formally contracted and then transferred to the fighting fronts after just one month. Abdul-Jabbar demanded the Prime Minister intervene, summon the Russian Ambassador, and cancel the contracts.
Security expert Salam Al-Abadi noted that both sides of the conflict employ foreign fighters to cover human losses. He warned that legally, these individuals are classified as “mercenaries” under international protocols, meaning they have no rights if captured, cannot be treated as prisoners of war, and can be prosecuted.
The right to travel… but
Iraq is classified as a country of origin for migrants according to the literature of the International Organization for Migration. Over the past four decades, Iraq has witnessed repeated waves of displacement, migration, asylum, and displacement, whether to countries in the Arab region or to Europe and the Americas.
In the 1990s, particularly between 1990 and 1995, more than 36,000 Iraqi migrants flocked to the countries of the Maghreb: Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco.
During the years of the Second Gulf War, the economic blockade crisis, and the occupation of Iraq between 1990 and 2013, approximately 3 million Iraqis were displaced to countries in the Arab Mashreq, such as Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Yemen.
Estimates indicate that the actual numbers may be much higher, as Iraqis constituted approximately 23% of the refugee movement in the Arab region.
More than one million Iraqis arrived in European countries during the 1990s and were granted political or humanitarian asylum.
Overall, the number of displaced Iraqis worldwide between 1990 and 2013 exceeded 7 million. However, their contribution to the local economy through remittances was limited, with the highest volume of remittances reaching only $316 million in 2014.
Legal expert Ali Al-Tamimi says that Iraqi youth over the age of 18 have the right to travel to various countries around the world, with no legal provision preventing them from traveling outside Iraq. Furthermore, the 2005 Iraqi Constitution allows citizens to hold more than one nationality, and Article 44/First states that “Iraqis have the freedom of movement, travel, and residence inside and outside Iraq.”
However, Al-Tamimi explains that “legal articles (9, 12, and 13) of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 impose penalties of up to seven years in prison on anyone who commits acts abroad that harm the interests of the state, such as fighting as a mercenary against a state or participating in an international conflict that could be considered a threat to national interests or affiliation with foreign parties, which allows the law to be applied to him upon his return.”
Students on Scholarship Outside the Accused Circle
An officer in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior revealed that security efforts to counter recruitment are underway but kept confidential, hampered by a lack of cooperation from the other countries involved. He noted that the initial goal for most young Iraqis was migration to Europe via Belarus, which then evolved into recruitment.
He stressed that Iraqi students on official Ministry of Higher Education scholarships are not involved. The recruits are those who obtain visas through unlicensed “university services offices,” often lacking the required academic qualifications.
The Ministry of Higher Education warned Iraqi students against dealing with these unlicensed social media offices, emphasizing that the official channels are the attachés and the Department of Missions.
Security expert Sarmad Al-Bayati urged the government to intervene urgently to stop the unannounced recruitment, warning that this file “may have a significant impact on Iraq, and we fear it will be exploited against us by the international community.
“This report was produced under the supervision of the NIRIJ Investigative Network.”
