Peace Talks Begin, But the Doors Remain Shut: Displaced Kurds Face Army Roadblocks to Return

On July 3, 2024, Dawood Youkhanna (72 years old), along with his family and other residents of the village of Miska in the Amedi district (70 km northeast of Duhok), fled their homes and abandoned their farms—their main source of income—after their village turned into a battlefield between PKK fighters and Turkish forces deployed in the surrounding area. The fighting caused fires that destroyed farmland and damaged many homes.

“It’s been almost a year since we left. We’ve endured harsh conditions and still live with the hope of returning,” Dawood says in a low voice, expressing his hope that the peace process launched in March 2024 and the PKK’s decision on May 12, 2025, to disband and end its armed struggle will finally bring an end to the 41-year conflict.

The Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT), an organization that documents violations in the region, reported one month after the peace announcement that the Turkish military had not halted its operations. Instead, the number of attacks increased by 78% in April compared to March, with 210 strikes launched during the month, mostly targeting areas in the Duhok province of the Kurdistan Region.

Dawood recalls his final hours in the village where he had spent his entire life: “That night, we had dinner as usual. Then we heard gunfire from various weapons, followed by aircraft flying overhead. Fighting broke out inside the village and in its surroundings for hours—it would intensify and then ease off. We tried to leave our homes, but we couldn’t for fear of being targeted and killed.”

He adds, “We didn’t sleep at all that night. The children were crying. When the clashes stopped during the day, we headed toward Duhok city, carrying nothing with us. We rented a house, hoping we would return soon—but a year has passed.

During the same period, fighting spread to four other villages, forcing their residents to flee as well. Weeks later, the number had risen to nine villages. The Turkish forces, which had advanced 30 km deep into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, declared these areas military security zones off-limits to civilians—adding these villages to dozens of others whose residents had been displaced over the past three decades.

Statistics from the Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT) indicate that the conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has led to the complete evacuation of 183 villages in the Kurdistan Region—107 in Duhok, 65 in Erbil, 8 in Sulaymaniyah, and 3 in Sinjar. The organization warns that an additional 602 villages are currently under threat of evacuation. Furthermore, the war has prevented the reconstruction of 405 villages since 1991.

The most heavily affected region is Duhok province, where 527 villages have been impacted. Erbil follows with 415 affected villages, then Sulaymaniyah with 233, in addition to 15 villages in the Sinjar district

CPT has recorded 721 civilian casualties resulting from Turkish bombing operations since January 1991—353 people were killed and 368 injured.

According to the International Crisis Group, the ongoing conflict between Turkey and the PKK caused over 7,000 deaths between July 2015 and January 2025. This includes 646 civilians, 1,494 Turkish military and security personnel, 4,786 PKK members, and 226 individuals whose affiliations remain unknown.

An Expanding Security Belt

Until June 2024, the Christian village of Miska—located in the Kani Masi subdistrict of Amedi—was considered safe. Its residents managed their agricultural fields and daily lives peacefully. However, as Turkish military operations expanded, shelling reached the village’s outskirts and damaged its farmlands

Dawood explains: “We had two large orchards with walnut and grape trees, along with a thousand apple trees. The produce was our main source of income. Many of the trees were burned to ash during the clashes. Now, we have no idea what remains.”

In the first half of 2024, the Turkish army expanded its military operations by building more roads into the mountains and strategically important areas to establish new outposts. Additional military reinforcements were deployed to high ground overlooking Kani Masi and other mountain ranges in the Amedi district.

Over the past six years, the Turkish government has continued implementing what it calls a “security belt” within Iraqi territory, claiming it is necessary to protect its borders from PKK attacks. The Turkish army, using both heavy and medium weaponry, has pushed more than 15 km deep into the Kurdistan Region and launched intense strikes on suspected PKK positions, turning hundreds of square kilometers into restricted military zones inaccessible to civilians.

In June 2020, Turkey launched a new wave of military operations along the Iraqi border under the names Operation Claw-Tiger and Operation Claw-Eagle, followed by Claw-Eagle 2 in February 2021. At some points, Turkish forces reached up to 30 km into Iraqi territory. These operations continued through 2022 and 2023, displacing residents of dozens of villages, particularly in the Zakho and Amedi districts

In July 2024, residents of four villages—Miska, Tishampikê, Darjal, and Shelaza—were forced to flee. In the following weeks, two more villages—Maji and Gurgashê—were evacuated after intermittent clashes between the PKK and Turkish forces led to the burning of hundreds of dunams of farmland and the destruction of many homes.

A source from the Assyrian Movement, a Christian political organization, stated: “Generally, we warn residents not to leave their homes at night unless absolutely necessary. We also stress the importance of avoiding side roads, sticking to main routes, and staying close to them to avoid becoming targets.”

Material Losses, Displacement, and Migration

Duhok, once renowned for its rich production of various fruits that supplied the rest of Iraq, has changed drastically over the past three decades due to war and mass displacement. Once a productive region, it has now become a consumer one.

Miska, one of the region’s oldest villages, was home to a large number of families. According to the village mukhtar, Adeeb Mustafa, “Two decades ago, about 500 families—mostly Christian—lived in Miska. In recent years, the number has dwindled, and now only 11 Christian families remain.”

He adds, “Dozens of villages have been evacuated in past years due to armed clashes that destroyed agricultural lands and orchards—cutting off people’s primary livelihood.

Mustafa estimates that in Miska alone, at least 50 orchards were either fully or partially burned, most of them planted with apples, plums, walnuts, sumac, and other crops. Each orchard spans an average of five dunams (around 5,000 square meters).

Raising both hands, he says: “Even the village’s only church was damaged during the clashes and shelling. Its doors, windows, and pews were affected—it is no longer usable for worship and will need full restoration if people ever return.”

Yousif Esho, a member of the Assyrian Movement’s leadership in Amedi, confirms this, saying, “During the clashes and before the village was fully evacuated, four Christian homes were burned, the church was severely damaged, and vast areas of orchards and farmland were lost to fire.”

Over 35 years of recurring Turkish military operations—which have recently turned into direct occupation of large areas—have forced hundreds of Christian families out of their ancestral villages in the Amedi and Zakho districts. These families had lived alongside Muslims for centuries. Many have emigrated to Europe, while others relocated to urban centers.

The continued Turkish operations and Ankara’s lack of concrete steps toward resolving the conflict—such as releasing Kurdish political prisoners like Peoples’ Democratic Party leader Selahattin Demirtaş, or easing restrictions on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan—suggest that the peace process has not truly begun. Therefore, the return of residents to villages in Amedi and Zakho appears unlikely.

This may explain why Zakros Hiwa, spokesperson for the PKK’s foreign relations office, stated that the decisions made during the PKK’s recent congress do not signify abandoning armed struggle. “Rather, it’s a declaration to end the conflict in its current form—because the conditions for peace have not matured, especially with continued Turkish attacks.”

Despite thousands of families being affected by Turkish operations, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not provided assistance—not even to those displaced in mid-2024—due to limited financial resources. Moreover, the KRG has not issued any official statements demanding that Ankara compensate victims who lost homes, fields, and livelihoods.

Most of those who fled between June and July 2024 speak of financial losses amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars. The lands they had cultivated for a decade are now “dead” due to the lack of irrigation.

Farid Yaqoub, a member of the fourth session of parliament and a leader in the Assyrian Movement, said: “We have a Christian charitable organization that supports families displaced to Duhok because of Turkish operations. Over the years, our people have fled multiple villages and have not returned. In the end, it is our people who suffer and pay the price.”

While the KRG remains silent on Turkish operations, the Iraqi central government limits its response to statements urging Turkey to stop violating Iraq’s sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Turkey consistently reaffirms its ongoing operations inside Iraq—both through President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and top military and security officials—insisting on completing a “security strip” along the Iraqi border.

Even after the PKK announced in early May 2025 that it was dissolving itself and ending armed struggle, Turkey continued with the same rhetoric—vowing not to halt operations until “every potential security threat is eliminated.” This deepens the concerns and fears of displaced communities and many Iraqis, who suspect that Turkey is planning to remain in the area for many years, according to Kurdish parties and organizations.

These concerns are compounded by Turkey’s continued establishment of military and security bases, which have now exceeded 70 (up from 64 in 2022), along with a growing network of supply roads stretching from the Turkish border deep into Iraqi territory.

Zakros Hiwa of the PKK clarified: “No written or verbal agreement was made between the PKK and the Turkish government. What occurred was a unilateral goodwill gesture by the PKK to pave the way for a democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue. What happens next depends on the legal and political steps taken by the Turkish state.”

Catastrophic Outcomes

According to CPT statistics, clashes between PKK fighters and the Turkish military in the Kurdistan Region have resulted in the complete evacuation of 183 villages. Another 602 villages face the risk of displacement, and nearly 400 others have been unable to undergo reconstruction.

CPT, which documents Turkish and Iranian violations on the ground, reported that during operations conducted between June 15 and July 15, 2024, Turkey’s military campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan caused:

The evacuation of 9 villages

The displacement of 184 families

The burning of more than 68,000 dunams of agricultural land an forests

Additionally, the organization documented the bombing and destruction of:1 church,1 tahini factory,1 vehicle,2 water sources and 19 civilian homes with nine civilians were killed in Turkish operations from the start of 2024 through the end of July.

Many Christian villages lie within areas now under Turkish control, making it impossible for their residents to return. While Muslim residents are attempting to resettle and rebuild lives in nearby towns and cities, most displaced Christians have either emigrated or plan to do so.

Christian activist Sami Boutros warns: “This situation will lead to increased Christian emigration. I live in the village of Enishki in the Sarsing area. There are periodic clashes and shelling. We feel there is no future for us here, so I, like others, am thinking about leaving.”

He adds: “If this war continues, there will be no Christians left here. Everyone will either migrate abroad or resettle in other cities.”

The Peace Process and the Dream of Return

Saleh Kamel, the mukhtar of Sergali village, located in the Kani Masi subdistrict and abandoned by its residents, says: “In mid-2024, the people of our village attempted to return home three times in a row, but the Turkish military would not allow it.”

Now living in Duhok, he explains, “We have no life here. We used to own orchards and many properties in the village, but here we own nothing. We tried to return several times, but the Turkish army wouldn’t allow it. They’ve set up checkpoints, and anyone who tries to return to the village is forced to turn back.”

He adds: “After the fighting stopped, we spoke with the local authorities about our desire to return. But all they say is: ‘Wait…’ We don’t know how long we’ll be waiting.”

Weeks have passed since the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced its dissolution and the end of its armed struggle, yet villages in Duhok province near Turkish military bases—or now under Turkish control—continue to be shelled. The Turkish government has not taken any legal steps to amend its constitution, revise anti-terror laws, or release the 4,000 Kurdish political prisoners—demands the PKK sees as prerequisites for genuine peace.

Local Kurdish sources report that during the last week of May 2025, Turkey carried out 128 artillery attacks on the Kurdistan Region.

According to these sources, Turkey has continued shelling several areas in Duhok province, damaging civilians’ homes and abandoned farmlands. Among the targeted areas were Mount “Hewt Tebeq” and other regions within the Amedi district, causing wildfires in farms, forests, and brushlands, particularly around the village of “Birjê.”

These ongoing military operations, coupled with the Turkish government and parliament’s failure to take tangible political or legal steps to support the peace process, cast doubt on its future. This prompted Zakros Hiwa, the PKK’s Foreign Relations Spokesperson, to say: “Talking about disarming the PKK is premature as long as the Turkish state continues its occupation and attacks both in Turkey and the Kurdistan Region.”

Zakros further noted that Turkey “has not taken any real steps yet—no legal or political reforms—and its continued military operations completely contradict any official rhetoric about a desire for peace.”

He concludes: “Even if the peace process advances, it’s unclear whether Ankara is willing to withdraw from the areas it controls inside Iraq, or allow displaced residents to return and resume their lives—even under Turkish occupation.”