Redrawing Nineveh: Are Minority Needs Being Servedor Manipulated?”

As soon as Nineveh was fully liberated from ISIS in the summer of 2017, political movements started to emerge, particularly around the time of each election, regarding its administrative future. Representatives of minorities—including Turkmen, Christians, Shabaks, and Yazidis—repeatedly announced their desire to transform their areas (Tel Afar, Sinjar, and the Nineveh Plain) into separate provinces.

These aspirations turned into formal efforts by political parties and forces, especially after the Iraqi Parliament voted on April 14, 2025, to approve the creation of Halabja Province—making it the fourth province in the Kurdistan Region and the 19th in Iraq.

Minority Areas

Nineveh spans 33,313 square kilometers and has a population of approximately 4.7 million. It includes 31 administrative units—ten of which are districts, the largest being Mosul (the center), with the rest being sub-districts. Below is a summary:

Mosul District: Mostly Sunni Arabs. Sub-districts include:

Qayyarah (Sunni Arabs)

Bashiqa (Sunni and Shia Shabaks, Yazidis, and Christians)

Shura (Sunni Arabs)

Mahlabiya (Turkmen)

Hammam al-Alil (Sunni Arabs)

Hamdaniya District:

Qaraqosh/Bakhdida (Christians)

Bartella (mainly Christians, with Sunni and Shia Shabaks)

Tall Kayf District:

Tall Kayf City (Arabs and Christians)

Alqosh Sub-district (Christians)

Wana Sub-district (Arabs and Kurds)

Sinjar District:

Sinjar City (Kurdish Muslims, Yazidis, Arabs)

Al-Shamal Sub-district (Yazidis)

Al-Qayrawan (Arabs)

Tel Afar District:

Tel Afar City (Sunni and Shia Turkmen)

Zumar Sub-district (Arabs, Kurds, Yazidis)

Rabia Sub-district (Arabs)

Al-Ayadiyah (Turkmen, Arabs, Kurds)

Shekhan District: Administratively linked to Nineveh, but de facto controlled by the Kurdistan Region.

Shekhan City (Muslim Kurds, Yazidis)

Zlikan (Kurds, Yazidis, Arabs)

Al-Ba’aj District:

Al-Ba’aj City (Sunni Arabs)

Al-Qahtaniyah Sub-district (Yazidis)

Al-Hadar District:

Al-Hadar City (Sunni Arabs)

Al-Tal Sub-district (Sunni Arabs)

Makhmour District:

Makhmour City (Kurds)

Kweir,(Kurds and arab)

Kandinaweh, Qaraj (Kurds)

Al-Adnaniya (Arabs)

Semel District: administratively part of Nineveh but practically under the Kurdistan Region.

Semel City (Kurds, Yazidis)

Faida Sub-district (Kurds)

What makes Nineveh unique is its historical concentration of minorities: Christians in Qaraqosh, Bartella, Alqosh, and Tall Kayf; Yazidis in Bashiqa and Sinjar; Turkmen in Tel Afar and Salamiyah; and Shabaks in villages north and east of Mosul—along with Kakais and Kurds in scattered villages.

Researcher Adel Kamal notes that armed extremist groups that became active in Nineveh after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003 systematically targeted minorities. He explains:

“Many non-Muslim minorities lived in Mosul and worked there when the regime collapsed, but they became targets for extremist Islamic groups who considered them infidels, forcing them to flee.”

Driven by religious fatwas, political motives, or personal ambitions, these groups kidnapped and killed hundreds of Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Shia Turkmen. Kamal adds:

“These groups—especially al-Qaeda, and later ISIS—used to seize the property of minorities in Mosul, often marking homes with graffiti like: ‘Not for sale or rent, this house is prepared for demolition’ or ‘Property of the Islamic State.’”

This pushed minorities to isolate themselves in their own areas: Yazidis in Sinjar, Shekhan, and Bashiqa; Christians in Qaraqosh, Bartella, and Alqosh; and Shabaks in their villages.

What helped Christians and Yazidis fleeing Mosul find refuge in the Nineveh Plain was the Kurdish Peshmerga’s control over the area—since it is disputed territory between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

“Before 2014, minorities saw the area as a safe haven,” says researcher Mohammed Saif, “but after Nineveh was liberated from ISIS in 2017, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) took over the Plain instead of the Peshmerga.”

When ISIS took Mosul in June 2014, its fighters marked seized Christian homes with the letter “N” ( for Nasrani aka Christian), branding them for confiscation.

Saif explains:“So we’re looking at two waves of minority migration: the first from Mosul to their historical towns between 2003 and 2014; the second after ISIS took over Mosul, as minorities—especially Yazidis, Christians, Shia Turkmen, and Shabaks—fled their towns fearing massacres.”

Given two decades of violence, displacement, and marginalization, it’s no surprise that minorities are now seeking autonomy or the creation of their own provinces.

Tel Afar and the Dream of Becoming a Province

The district of Tel Afar, located west of Nineveh, is considered the largest district in Iraq by population, with nearly 700,000 residents. Its administrative center (Tel Afar city) spans 3,206 km², and the majority of its inhabitants are Turkmen—both Shia and Sunni.

The district includes three sub-districts:

Rabia, inhabited by the Shammar Arab tribe

Zummar, composed of 78 villages divided among Arabs, Yazidis, and Kurds

Al-Ayadiyah, home to Turkmen, Arabs, and Kurds

Demands to transform Tel Afar into a province date back more than five decades, particularly the 1970s. Researcher Yassin Obeid says the residents of Tel Afar had hoped the ruling Baath Party would grant provincial status, but instead, Duhok Province was established in 1970, followed by Najaf Province in 1976.

Obeid explains:”The Iraqi regime at the time didn’t want a Turkmen-majority province. It even changed the name of Kirkuk—where many Turkmen live—to ‘Al-Ta’mim’ (nationalization). Another reason was sectarian: half of Tel Afar’s population is Shia Turkmen, and the regime was Sunni-dominated.”

After the 2003 fall of Saddam’s regime, Tel Afar residents believed they had a real opportunity to claim provincial status. They even unofficially declared it by placing signs reading “Province of Tel Afar” at the city’s entrance.

A formal step occurred on January 21, 2014, when the Iraqi Council of Ministers approved the transformation of Tel Afar (in Nineveh) and Tuz Khurmatu (in Salahaddin) into provinces, based on a proposal by then-Minister of Youth and Sports, Jassim Mohammed Jaafar. However, the plan stalled in parliament due to political disagreements.

Calls to convert Tel Afar into a province resurfaced after ISIS was defeated in the area in 2017. Turkmen MP Mukhtar Al-Mousawi, head of the Turkmen Bloc, and MP Khalil Al-Mulla sought parliamentary support for the proposal in 2020.

However, Sunni and Kurdish parties opposed the idea, fearing Tel Afar would become a Shia province under PMF control. Tribal leader Mazahim Al-Huwait expressed these concerns:

“Arabs in Tel Afar and even in Sinjar oppose this move due to the absence of many original residents (Sunnis) who haven’t returned. Making it a province now would mean handing local governance entirely to the Turkmen.”

On November 26, 2024, MP Al-Mousawi announced in a press conference that he had gathered over 150 MPs’ signatures in support of transforming Tel Afar and surrounding areas into a province. He described the region as “marginalized by Nineveh’s local government.”

On March 28, 2025, he submitted a formal request to the Parliamentary Committee on Regions, which then contacted the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to proceed. However, political consensus between Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and some Shia forces allowed only Halabja to be elevated to a province, while Tel Afar’s file was shelved.

Disappointment was clear in Al-Mousawi’s statement on May 11, 2025, where he said the proposal was postponed until the next parliamentary session, since the current parliament had entered recess and pre-election campaigning, making it hard to pass laws.

This means that Tel Afar will not be discussed in 2025. With elections scheduled for November 2025, and the next parliament likely convening in 2026, proponents of provincial status may have to start from scratch—especially if Al-Mousawi fails to win re-election or the political climate shifts.

Al-Jazira Province: A Dream among Tribes

In response to the declared rejection by representatives of the Sunni component in the Iraqi Parliament of the establishment of a new province—either (Nineveh Plain and Tal Afar) or just (Tal Afar)—due to fears of creating an ethnic or sectarian entity (Shiite dominance), those demanding a new province, especially the Turkmen of Tal Afar, were left with no option but to slightly modify their proposal. They included Arab, Yazidi, and even Kurdish areas, shifting the demand from Tal Afar Province to what is now called the “Al-Jazira Province.”

However, a civil activist from Tal Afar, who asked to be referred to by the pseudonym “Jaafar,” says the people of Tal Afar “are not united in their stance, do not easily grant trust in elections, and there are internal political divisions (between Shiites and Sunnis). Signs of division and lack of unified demands will yield negative outcomes if the Al-Jazira Province is formed with Tal Afar as part of it.”

He explains, “Key positions in the local government would go to Arabs from the Shammar tribe, who are spread across Rabia and other areas on the Syrian border. Some positions would go to Yazidis in Sinjar or Kurds in Zummar. Tal Afar’s people would receive little, due to their fragmentation and the fact that many displaced Shiites (in the south) and Sunni migrants (in Kurdistan and Turkey) have not returned.”

He cited the representation of Tal Afar in the Nineveh Provincial Council and the Iraqi Parliament: “Representatives from other areas are active and influential, such as MPs Abdul Rahim al-Shammari and Naif al-Shammari. In contrast, Tal Afar’s representatives are generally ineffective despite the city’s large population.”

Jaafar believes the people of Tal Afar must unite, set aside their differences, and prioritize the future of their region. Without this unity, the declaration of Tal Afar or Al-Jazira as a province “will only benefit corrupt deal-makers.”

Within the Yazidi community, especially in Sinjar—which still suffers the destruction caused by the war to liberate it from ISIS, with about half its Yazidi population displaced or in camps—a civil activist, who requested anonymity for security reasons, stated that multiple armed groups with varying loyalties control the district and share power on the ground. There is significant political conflict among influential forces, “which prevents Sinjar from being reconstructed or receiving its full share of development projects.

He asked: “Under such conditions, how can we speak of joining an administrative entity, or even establishing a separate one for the district—especially with the continued absence of displaced Yazidis and Muslim Kurds?”

On February 4, 2019, the then Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani, called for turning the Sinjar district into a province, stating: “The Kurdistan Region and Iraq must work toward this goal.”

The Sinjar activist commented on Barzani’s call, which is now over six years old: “Sinjar is not Halabja. The Shiite and Sunni forces, and many Yazidis in the district, will not allow it to become a province under the Region’s authority.”

In addition to the lack of Yazidi-Kurdish consensus and the disunity among Turkmen voices, some Sunni Arab politicians believe the proposal to create Al-Jazira Province instead of Tal Afar Province is an attempt by the Shiite-dominated forces in the area, especially the Popular Mobilization Forces, to portray the initiative as “non-sectarian” by including Sunni Arab areas in the map.

A source in the Nineveh Provincial Council, who requested anonymity, said that the main driver behind the idea of establishing new provinces in or near the Nineveh Plain “are the Shiites.” He noted that “Shiites are represented not only through the PMF but also hold significant power and presence within the broader security apparatus, including the army, police, and intelligence agencies, as well as the central government and Parliament.”

He stated that the core aim is “purely political,” related to the future of “Sunnis in their areas.” He explained: “There is clearly a Shiite agenda to prevent Sunnis from forming an independent administrative region.” Additionally, it would deprive the remaining parts of Nineveh, especially Mosul, of its only border outlet, since the Rabia border crossing with Syria would be annexed to Tal Afar or Al-Jazira.

He added: “It would also result in the loss of key oil fields to the west and strategic irrigation projects to the east such as the Eastern Al-Jazira Canal.”

These concerns align with the statements made by former Nineveh Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi in early 2014, when the cabinet—then headed by Nouri al-Maliki—approved the conversion of Tal Afar into a province. Al-Nujaifi said, “There is a plan to divide Nineveh into three provinces: Tal Afar (west), the Nineveh Plain (east), and what remains of the current Nineveh.” He added that it was “a preemptive step to prevent the formation of a unified Sunni region.”

MP Talib al-Maamari, representing Nineveh, expressed his strong surprise at the proposal by the Badr Parliamentary Bloc to turn Nineveh Plain and Tal Afar into a province, saying that it was an “impossible proposition, given that the Nineveh Plain is in the east, and Tal Afar in the west.

As for Tal Afar Province, he asked: “What is the purpose of turning it into a province? Is it to appeal to voters, serve as election propaganda, or destabilize security in Nineveh?” He acknowledged that Tal Afar has been administratively neglected “in terms of appointments, reconstruction, or services—and the administrative body it follows is supposed to provide all that.”

He noted that Tal Afar, located on the Syrian border, “if turned into a province, will affect our [Sunni] areas,” citing the ongoing instability in Syria and its potential spillover into Iraq, emphasizing the need to preserve unity.

Nineveh Plain

Unlike other areas in Nineveh, the Nineveh Plain, according to specialists, is a geographical term rather than an administrative one. It refers to the area extending from the north of Mosul city, including the district of Tel Kaif, passing through the Shabak villages up to the far east of Mosul where the district of Al-Hamdaniya is located, which includes the historical Christian towns. The plain is also home to Yazidis in Bashiqa and Bahzani, as well as Kurds and Arabs in scattered villages.

Yaqo Hermes, a researcher on Christian affairs, says that the Nineveh Plain and the city of Mosul “represent the most important areas of Christian presence in Iraq. In the plain, there are their historic towns such as Baghdeda, Bartella, and Qosh, while in Mosul there are 35 Christian churches and schools, which are the oldest in the Middle East.” He also mentioned that Nineveh was built by Christians and that they were the original inhabitants of Mosul: “However, their presence in Nineveh, as in the rest of Iraq, began to diminish over the last four decades and accelerated after the fall of the previous Iraqi regime in 2003, due to targeting by extremist armed groups such as Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, and finally ISIS.”

According to several figures, extremist armed groups were not the only threat to Christians and others in the Nineveh Plain. The area being disputed between the Kurdistan Region and the central government in Baghdad, according to Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution, made residents feel “constant anxiety.” They pointed out that the conflict over the area led to repeated changes in the governing authority, causing deprivation from reconstruction and services.

Looking back at the security deterioration in Nineveh from 2003 until ISIS fully controlled it in June 2014, the residents of Nineveh Plain, especially Christians and Shia Shabak, were repeatedly targeted by car bombings that caused hundreds of casualties. During that period, Christians, Shabak, and Yazidis in Mosul were also subjected to organized assassinations and kidnappings, forcing them to flee entirely to the Nineveh Plain. After June 2014, ISIS attacked them there as well, forcing them to flee toward the Kurdistan Region, other parts of Iraq, or abroad.

After the full liberation of Nineveh from ISIS in summer 2017, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), represented by the 30th Shabak Brigade and the 50th Christian Brigade, took control of the Nineveh Plain, replacing the Peshmerga forces. Researcher Adel Kamal says: “These forces prevent any outsider from buying, selling, or exploiting property there, under the pretext of preventing demographic change, which is exactly what the Kurdish Peshmerga forces did before them.”

The security tension and targeting of Nineveh Plain residents led representatives of the region to demand solutions. According to Adel Kamal, these demands evolved between 2003 and 2007 to include “calling for UN intervention and placing the Nineveh Plain under its protection, i.e., internationalizing the issue.” Then between 2007 and 2014, they called for autonomy, and after the liberation of the Plain from ISIS, voices grew louder demanding the conversion of the Nineveh Plain into a province.

Christian Decline and Shabak Enthusiasm

The parliamentary vote to convert Halabja into a province in April 2025 stimulated some Christian political parties—such as the Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Beth Nahrain National Union Party, the Beth Nahrain Democratic Party, and the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council—to issue a statement on April 25, 2025, demanding that the Nineveh Plain also be turned into a province.

The statement indicated that the demand is fundamentally an administrative right, but Christian figures in the Nineveh Plain we contacted noted that the trend in Christian towns does not align with what was stated in the political parties’ statement, and they fear that this proposal, unless preceded by a “security correction of the area’s conditions,” will benefit one Christian faction alone—Babylon Movement, which is affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces.

(G.L), a social figure from Qaraqosh (also known as Baghdeda), says that Christians now constitute only about 10% of the population in the Nineveh Plain compared to the Shabak, who avoided migration and remained in their areas. This is the reason for the Christians’ stopping their old demands to convert the Nineveh Plain into a province or grant it autonomy.

He explains: “Currently, due to migration and displacement, Christians will never be able to compete with the Shabak, who form the majority in the Nineveh Plain. If the plain becomes a province, for example, Christians will not have enough electoral weight to obtain major positions in the local government.”

The official website of the Chaldean Patriarchate published estimated numbers of Christians in the Nineveh Plain: “In the towns of the Nineveh Plain along the Hamdaniya line—Karamles, Bartella, and villages around the Mar Mattai Monastery—their number is about 26,432 Christians, 95% of whom are Syriacs according to information sent by His Excellency Bishop Benedict Yonan Hano. The number might rise to 30,000 with the Syriacs in Bartella and its suburbs and the Chaldeans of Karamles.”

The site also stated that Talkaif, Batanya, Baqofa, Tel Skuf, Qosh, and Sheikhān have “about 20,000 to 25,000 Christian residents who are Chaldeans, while in Mosul there are now only 70 Christian families.”

Meanwhile, Younis Al-Agha, a Shabak activist from the Nineveh Plain, estimates the Shabak population spread across more than 70 villages in the Nineveh Plain at over 250,000 people.

The commander of the 30th Shabak Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the largest controlling force in the Nineveh Plain, and also MP Waad Al-Qadou, was among those who supported the parliamentary bloc of Badr’s demand to convert the Nineveh Plain and Tal Afar into provinces.

He justified the demand by saying it represents “a rescue for the Iraqi components from marginalization. Tal Afar and the Nineveh Plain have suffered great injustice from local administrations and former governors of Nineveh.”

Looking briefly at the geographical location of the Nineveh Plain, some believe that Shia political forces are pushing the Shabak and also some Christians loyal to them to adopt the demand to convert the plain into a province, along with the demand to convert Tal Afar in the west into a province as well, “in order to impose a tight Shia siege around Mosul, the largest Sunni city.”

Researcher and writer Ghazi Badr explains: “The Nineveh Plain forms the northeastern boundary of Mosul and contains all the roads linking it to the Kurdistan Region and Turkey, while Tal Afar in the west borders Syria.”

According to his conviction, and the belief of many politicians in Nineveh, this is meant to “prevent any future attempt to establish a Sunni region in western Iraq.”

Economic expert Bilal Lazem sees the goal behind some political forces’ demand to convert the Nineveh Plain and Tal Afar into provinces as “political and economic,” aiming to weaken Nineveh economically and even paralyze its movement entirely.

He clarifies: “The Nineveh Plain lies within what is known as the rainfall line, meaning it receives sufficient rainfall. It has the most fertile agricultural lands, which support the development of livestock wealth. It also contains roads leading to Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dohuk, which are the main trade routes, as well as the road linking to the international border with Turkey.”

Regarding Tal Afar, “the district contains oil reserves and fertile lands and also includes the international border crossing with Syria—the Rabia border crossing—as well as livestock wealth.”

Retired legal expert Walid Al-Taie points out that the diversity of components in the Nineveh Plain means “involving them in governing and managing the prospective province, which is difficult given the dominance of the Popular Mobilization Forces in the area.”

The investigation was conducted by NIRIJ Network for investigative journalism on behalf of Midan.