Marginalization policies and lack of justice… The Yezidis of Sheikhan from ruling majority to weak minority

After spending nearly four decades in Sheikhan, Hadi Dubbani (57 years old) left the country with his family, leaving the Yezidi town located north of Mosul to settle in Germany, as did dozens of his relatives. He says in a choked voice: “ISIS destroyed everything for us, it turned our lives upside down. I even left the land I never imagined I would leave. Many things pushed us to this decision: security, fear for the future, discrimination, and the absence of justice.”

Dubbani, who held the position of director of the Yezidi Endowment in Duhok Governorate in the Kurdistan Region for nearly seven years, affirms that if migration doors were opened to the Yezidis and facilitation measures were provided, “the rates of their migration would increase” from their historic cities, as “their presence there has become merely symbolic.”

During its attacks on Sinjar and the surrounding villages, ISIS kidnapped 6,417 Yezidis, including women and children, killed 1,293 Yezidis, destroyed 68 shrines, and left behind more than 80 mass graves of Yezidis, according to statistics from local organizations. These widespread killings instilled fear among the Yezidis in the Nineveh Plain and the areas where they are spread in the Kurdistan Region, prompting them to flee internally and later emigrate abroad.

In the absence of official statistics, the Directorate of Yezidi Affairs in the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs in the Kurdistan Regional Government estimates the number of Yezidis in Iraq to be around 550,000 people. About 360,000 of them were displaced during the ISIS attacks to the cities of the Kurdistan Region, and more than 100,000 immigrated to other countries.

A Majority That Became a Minority

The Sheikhan district is home to the Yezidis and is where the sacred Lalish temple is located, a pilgrimage site for Yezidis from both within Iraq and abroad. For centuries, the Yezidis formed the overwhelming majority of the region’s population and its surroundings.

Historians and experts confirm that their population percentage ranged between 85% and 90%, but today they have become a minority, with their percentage dropping to about 30%. This decline is due to their continuous migration over the past three decades, on one hand, and the displacement of other groups to the district on the other.

Dubbani recalls, “My father always told us that between 1970 and 1975, when our family settled here, the center of Sheikhan had only three Muslim families, seven Christian families, and one Jewish family, while everyone else was Yezidi.” He points to the demographic changes that occurred in the region over just a few decades.

He continues, reminiscing about his youth: “In my youth, even during my time at university between 1989-1990, most of Sheikhan’s population were Yezidis. You would find only a small percentage of people from other communities.”

He continues, “After the Baath Party, through calculated decisions, transferred the services of several Muslim employees from other cities to Sheikhan, and with the opening of several government departments, hospitals, and new schools, the number of Muslims in Sheikhan gradually increased.”

Falah Hassan (44 years old), a head of two residential areas in the center of Sheikhan District, namely (Sheikh Mand) and (Sheikh Shams), says that the migration of Yezidis did not spare any home in Sheikhan. Four of his brothers have migrated abroad, along with many of his relatives.

He points out that more than 100 homes are currently locked in the two residential neighborhoods, after their owners migrated to Europe, noting that the majority of them left after 2014. He refers to the negative consequences of the ISIS attack on the lives and presence of the Yezidis, after the kidnappings and mass killings they suffered.

Hassan believes that migration rates were low before the ISIS attack: “From 2003 to 2014, migration rates ranged between “ 3% to 4% “ but after ISIS took control of Sinjar and the Nineveh Plain, the percentage of migrants and those wishing to migrate reached 70%.”

He points out that most Yezidis in Sheikhan, during and after ISIS’s control of Nineveh, “sold their lands at very low prices, which led to families from other groups, such as the Shabak, Gypsies, and Kurds, moving into the district and settling there.”

Although ISIS never reached the center of Sheikhan district, as the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, supported by the international coalition, fiercely defended the area, the fear and doubt sown by the organization in the hearts of the Yezidis, including the residents of the district, were enough to accelerate their migration rates abroad.

Civil activists from the Yezidi community say that people feared that Sheikhan would fall like Sinjar, completely in the hands of ISIS fighters, and that thousands more from these areas would become victims of the “terrorist group’s” purges. Many Yezidi relatives and acquaintances in the region fell into the hands of ISIS in Sinjar, and even after the group’s defeat, there was little optimism or hope for lasting stability.

Falah Hassan explains: “Before the arrival of ISIS, the number of migrating families was only a few dozen per year. But after 2014, the number reached hundreds. In my neighborhood, more than 100 homes were put up for rent, and many other homes were left vacant.”

He continues, “If I were to list the names of those who migrated, I would take an hours. The house across mine once housed 15 people, all of whom migrated. Five of my brothers now live abroad. Two of them migrated between 2007 and 2009, while the others, along with my mother, migrated after 2014.”

The population of Sheikhan, including displaced people, is around 130,000. About 40,000 reside in the city center, while the rest live in its districts and villages. Administratively, Sheikhan belongs to Nineveh Governorate, but it has been effectively managed by Duhok Governorate since 2003, as it is a disputed area between the governments of Erbil and Baghdad, and its fate has not been resolved to this day.

This administrative dispute between the two governments has affected its urban and service realities. For years, the area has been deprived of many services, with each government shifting the responsibility to the other.

The former Yezidi official Hadi Dubbani confirms that “the noticeable migration from Sheikhan occurred in two phases. The first phase was after 2003, when the rate remained low, with one young person migrating for every 20 families. However, the second phase, after 2014, was different and witnessed widespread migration. You will not find a family where no one has migrated, due to security concerns, economic deterioration, and uncertainty about their future.”

The majority of migrating Yezidis head to Western European countries, particularly Germany, where the largest Yezidi community in the world is located. Some Yezidis also migrated from Sheikhan to Duhok and its suburbs, or to other cities where better job opportunities and services are available.

Why do Yezidis migrate ?

While the war with ISIS raged on, and amidst the dire conditions, most Yezidis were stuck in camps, with daily news of ISIS atrocities and victim stories circulating. Many people from Sheikhan were leaving after selling their properties at very low prices, intending to migrate. Dubbani left his city and moved to Duhok.

He says: “It was in 2016, and during my stay there, I witnessed the gradual migration occurring from Kurdistan. From there, I moved to Zakho, and my wife suffered a stroke. With the financial situation deteriorating due to delayed salary payments and cuts for nearly three years, I sold my wife’s jewelry and decided to migrate.”

The decision for the majority of Yezidis to migrate was driven by the crimes of ISIS and the abductions and killings of Yezidis based on their identity. However, there were other decisive factors, such as the deteriorating economic situation, the lack of job opportunities, the absence of social justice, and the neglect of Sheikhan in terms of providing services. Additionally, there was the “policy of open doors in the city to make it a religiously and ethnically open society, and to make it a capital of coexistence,” according to a Yezidi activist who preferred to remain anonymous.

He adds, “This created a sense of discomfort among the Yezidis, who felt they were second-class citizens in the district.”

Hadi Dubbani further highlights several other factors that contributed to the increase in migration, including political factors. He says, “When the Kurdistan Democratic Party came to Sheikhan after 2003 and took control of its administration, they adopted a failed policy. They appointed people who were not qualified to positions, promoted some to administrative roles while ignoring others who were more competent, which led to a negative reaction.”

He continues, “There was social discrimination. Yezidi youth remained deprived of job opportunities and positions in the workforce, among other issues. All of these factors combined contributed to the frustration of the Yezidis. In fact, there is a well-known joke among the Yezidis of Sheikhan, which says that they are used only as decoration for embellishment.”

The Absence of Justice and Law

Mohammad Aref, a researcher interested in the region’s conditions and history, observes a kind of discrimination and marginalization that the Yezidis in Sheikhan faced, which contributed to their migration. He says, “After the liberation of Mosul and the defeat of ISIS, the government confiscated land belonging to Yezidis in exchange for minimal compensation. The municipality then sold this land at high prices to others, such as the Gypsies, Shabaks, and other groups, which led to an increase in the proportion of these groups compared to the Yezidis in the center of Sheikhan.”

He points out that this practice was repeated after 2005, when land was distributed in a manner he describes as unjust, through mediations and favoritism. He continues, “Some of this land was distributed to members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and others close to it.”

In addition to security, economic issues, and discrimination, Hadi Baba Sheikh, the head of the “Baba Sheikh” office (the highest religious position among the Yezidis), discusses a range of other factors that he believes are behind the migration of Yezidis and the decline in their presence in Sheikhan.

He says, “The state of chaos and laxity in the country, along with the lack of guarantees for the enforcement of the law, is the main reason for migration. There is no situation like this anywhere in the world, where you find two leaders in the same area and neighborhood—one answers to the federal government, and the other to the Kurdistan Regional Government. Or where you have two municipal, agricultural, and educational offices. If state institutions had done their work properly, and the state had legal authority and good management, this migration wouldn’t have happened.”

Hadi Baba Sheikh adds, “We often talk about peaceful coexistence. In reality, coexistence doesn’t depend on me or you—it is linked to the state’s law and its enforcement. But unfortunately, the state is unable to guarantee the application of the law. In just one month of 2024, four murders occurred in Sheikhan due to the absence of the state and law,” indicating the Yezidis’ feeling of insecurity.

The religious figure also criticizes the lack of job opportunities at a time when oil companies continue their activities in central Sheikhan: “In the heights of the Badrah subdistrict in Sheikhan, oil companies are operating, with people from outside the region working there, while our youth are still working with pickaxes and shovels.”

He directs his question to the area’s officials: “With all these companies within the administrative boundaries of the district, how many schools and hospitals have been built here? Our areas have been completely neglected. Go to the nearby Badrah sub district and ask about the number of government offices there. You will find that the court, water, civil defense, and many other service departments have not even been opened yet. Badrah is a sub district only in name. When the Yezidi sees all of this, they have no choice but to migrate.”

Hadi Baba Sheikh recounts an incident involving a Yezidi traffic policeman as an example of the absence of law and order. He says, “About six or seven years ago, a high-ranking government official came to Sheikhan. His son was driving a car and violated a rule on a restricted street. The traffic policeman stopped the car and informed him of the violation. Instead of addressing the issue, the father (the official) became furious and immediately contacted the Duhok Traffic Department, which issued an arrest warrant for the policeman. As a result, his mother suffered a stroke and passed away that same day.”

He adds, “Because of this incident, about 50 Yezidi traffic police officers migrated abroad. These officers saw that they could not carry out their duties or defend a Yezidi employee who had committed no offense but was wronged due to social discrimination and the absence of justice. Such incidents raise questions among the Yezidis about their lives and their future.”

Hadi Baba Sheikh recounts an incident involving a Yezidi traffic policeman as an example of the absence of law and order. He says, “About six or seven years ago, a high-ranking government official came to Sheikhan. His son was driving a car and violated a rule on a restricted street. The traffic policeman stopped the car and informed him of the violation. Instead of addressing the issue, the father (the official) became furious and immediately contacted the Duhok Traffic Department, which issued an arrest warrant for the policeman. As a result, his mother suffered a stroke and passed away that same day.”

He adds, “Because of this incident, about 50 Yezidi traffic police officers migrated abroad. These officers saw that they could not carry out their duties or defend a Yezidi employee who had committed no offense but was wronged due to social discrimination and the absence of justice. Such incidents raise questions among the Yezidis about their lives and their future.”

To stop immigration?

Khaled Nermo believes that stopping migration requires a process of rebuilding trust among the Yezidi individuals, and this cannot be achieved unless Yezidis hold positions of authority. He says, “Although the Kurdistan Regional Government has not neglected this aspect, the Yezidis are still waiting for more. For example, the mayor of Sheikhan should be Yezidi. Is it logical that there is no suitable Yezidi candidate for this position or that a Yezidi cannot manage the district?”

He emphasizes the importance of giving the district special attention, increasing the implementation of service projects, and providing job opportunities for the youth, while also ensuring the protection of their identity as Yezidis and as a minority.

Over the past two decades, three Yezidi individuals have held the position of mayor of Sheikhan, followed by three Muslims. Currently, the mayor is a Muslim.

Jawhar Ali Bek, the deputy prince of the Yezidis, states that the solution to the migration of Yezidis from their land lies in developing the region’s economy, “providing job opportunities for the youth, implementing service projects such as building modern hospitals and schools, and offering more financial and moral support to the Yezidis.”

However, Qidar Namer, a resident of Sheikhan who has been living in Germany for 16 years, argues that the issue is not only about economic and service conditions. He believes the matter is larger than that, expressing his conviction that “90% of Yezidis who migrate do not do so because of poverty, but because they do not feel safe.”

Namer, who doubts the possibility of halting migration under the current political and social circumstances, explains: “Before I came to Germany, I was an officer in the Iraqi government. I had no financial problems; the only reason I migrated was that I felt this country was not safe for us.”

The investigation was conducted under the supervision of the NIRIJ Network for Investigative Journalism as part of the “Investigative Journalism for Exposure and Follow-up” project.